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ABSTRACT 
Over the past 52 years, the world has progressed from the first man in space, to landing 
on the moon, to permanent human presence on manned space stations.  Mankind is now 
poised to explore even farther.  The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether 
international cooperation or competition is more in the U.S. interest from the perspective 
of political, technological, and cost-effectiveness criteria for returning humans to the 
moon, Mars or an asteroid and establishing a permanent presence.  The 1960s space race 
between the U.S. and USSR and current cooperation on the International Space Station 
will provide a historical basis for comparison.  Countries with major space programs will 
be reviewed for possible partnerships in future space endeavors.  This thesis concludes 
that the future and next steps for human spaceflight with international partners will need 
to begin as a coordinated and interdependent effort at the onset with the goal of habitation 
on the moon. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE .........................................................................................................1 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................1 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY ...................................................................................2 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................2 
F. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................5 
G. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS .........................................................................5 
II. THE 1960S SPACE RACE: COMPETITION BETWEEN U.S. AND 
RUSSIA .........................................................................................................................7 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................7 
1. Russian Space Exploration..................................................................7 
2. United States Space Exploration ......................................................10 
C. ADVANTAGES..............................................................................................13 
D. DISADVANTAGES .......................................................................................15 
E. LESSONS LEARNED ...................................................................................17 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................17 
III. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: A COOPERATIVE EFFORT .............21 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................21 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................22 
C. ADVANTAGES..............................................................................................34 
D. DISADVANTAGES .......................................................................................37 
E. LESSONS LEARNED ...................................................................................38 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................39 
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAMS .............................41 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 
B. CAPABILITIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES ..............................................42 
1. Russia ..................................................................................................42 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience..............................................42 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles ...................................45 
c. Future Plans ............................................................................47 
2. China ...................................................................................................50 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience..............................................51 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles ...................................56 
c. Future Plans ............................................................................59 
3. ESA Countries ....................................................................................61 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience..............................................62 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles ...................................66 
c. Future Plans ............................................................................70 
4. Japan ...................................................................................................71 
 viii 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience..............................................72 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles ...................................76 
c. Future Plans ............................................................................78 
5. India ....................................................................................................79 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience..............................................80 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles ...................................82 
c. Future Plans ............................................................................84 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................86 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................89 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................89 
1. Competition or Cooperation? ...........................................................95 
B. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH ..................................100 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................103 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................111 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Overview of space exploration capabilities .....................................................86 
Figure 2. Crewed space vehicles .....................................................................................87 
Figure 3. Potential lunar capabilities .............................................................................100 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Timetable of Space Events: 1960s ...................................................................18 
Table 2. Timetable of ISS Assembly Events .................................................................28 
Table 3. A Summary of the Integrated Options Evaluated by the Augustine 
Committee ........................................................................................................33 
Table 4. Space Station Total Costs as of 2010 ...............................................................36 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACTS Advanced Crew Transportation System 
ACV Advanced Crew Vehicle 
AECA Arms Export Control Act 
APM Attached Pressurized Module 
ARV Advanced Reentry Vehicle 
ASAT Anti-Satellite System 
ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle 
ATV-CC Automated Transfer Vehicle Control Centre 
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences 
CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 
CNES Centre National d‘Etudes Spatiales 
CNSA China National Space Administration 
COMSAT Communications Satellite Corporation 
DOS Durable Orbital Station 
ELDO European Launch Development Organization 
ERA European Robotic Arm 
ESA European Space Agency 
ESOC European Space Operations Centre 
ESRO European Space Research Organization 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FAI Fédération Aéronautique Internationale 
FY Fiscal Year 
GCTC Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center 
GES Global Exploration Strategy 
GSLV Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle 
HTV H-II (or Hope) Transfer Vehicle 
IGA Intergovernmental Agreement 
INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
ISAS Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science 
ISECG International Space Exploration Coordination Group 
 xiv 
ISRO Indian Space Research Organization 
ISS International Space Station 
ITAR International Trafficking in Arms Regulations 
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
JEM Japanese Experiment Module 
MLM Multipurpose Laboratory Module 
MOU Memoranda of Understanding 
MSS Mobile Servicing System 
MTFF Man-Tended Free Flyer 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASDA National Space Development Agency 
OPS Orbital Piloted Station 
SLV Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle 
SRE Space Recovery Experiment 
TBS Tokyo Broadcasting System 
UDMH Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VSE Vision for Space Exploration 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to thank the faculty and staff at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Prof. Moltz, thank you for always pushing me to be better.  Prof. Bursch, thank you for 
your motivation and guidance to get me to the finish line.  Thank you to the SSAG for 
never giving up on me.  To the Interlibrary Loan staff, thank you for all your work, effort 
and help in filling my 20+ requests for research books. 
I would also like to thank my parents.  Not only were you my own personal 
reference librarians, but you were my sounding board from the beginning to come up 
with this thesis topic and most importantly, my cheering section throughout the process. 
Tim, my husband and best friend, the words ―thank you‖ do not suffice for what 
you have done.  Thank you for always being there.  Thank you for taking care of 
EVERYTHING else these last several months, so all I had to do was concentrate on this 
thesis.  Thank you for being my editor.  Thank you for forcing me to sit down and knock 
it out.  Thank you for making me take breaks to not get burnt out.  Thank you for being 
you.  (We did it!  Our thesis is done!) 
Finally, none of this would be possible without the grace and mercy of my Lord 
and Savior.  Unto Him be the glory. 
 xvi 





Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese stated in testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences 
Subcommittee May 7, 2008 ―America needs to be seen as a leader into the future, and no 
venture, no journey, no undertaking represents the future more than human spaceflight.‖1  
Over the past 52 years, the world has progressed from the first man in space, to landing 
on the moon, to permanent human presence on manned space stations.  Mankind is now 
poised to explore even further, but the question remains, should this be done in 
competition or cooperation? 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether international cooperation or 
competition is more in the U.S. interest from the perspective of political, technological, 
and cost-effectiveness criteria for returning humans to the moon, Mars or an asteroid and 
establishing a permanent presence.  The 1960s space race between the U.S. and USSR 
and current cooperation on the International Space Station (ISS) will provide a historical 
basis for comparison.  Countries with major space programs will be reviewed for possible 
partnerships in future space endeavors. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research will be used to review current international space dynamics with a 
view toward determining if it is in the best interests of the U.S. to be a competitor or a 
cooperative partner.  The overarching research question of this thesis is whether 
international cooperation or competition is the best means for future human space 
exploration. 
                                                 
1Reauthorizing the Vision for Space Exploration: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences Subcommittee, 110th Cong. 14 
(2007) (statement of Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair, National Security Decision Making Department). 
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Breaking the above question down further, some smaller inter-related questions 
can be asked.  What lessons can be learned from the 1960s competitive space race 
between the U.S. and USSR as well as from the international cooperation on the ISS?  
Both case studies will be looked at in regards to political, technological, and cost 
dynamics.  Lastly, this thesis asks what the major space programs of other countries can 
contribute to enhance human space exploration. 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis will provide a full historical, global review of the major events and 
players in human spaceflight.  From this analysis a clear picture of available human space 
exploration options and the best course of action for the U.S. will be presented. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Considerations of the future of human spaceflight can be broken down into three 
schools of thought: single nation, collaborative process, or commercial means.  The latter 
will not be discussed in this thesis.  In order to rationalize the best method, historical 
experiences and countries‘ current capabilities will be investigated.  Various articles from 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, Space News, 
and Space Policy will be utilized.  Numerous internet sources to include the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) website, European Space Agency (ESA) 
website, and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) website will be employed.  
Public records such as the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee and 
Congressional Research Service‘s Report on the Space Activities of the United States, 
Soviet Union, and Other Launching Countries-organizations, 1957-1993 will be drawn 
on.  The works of Daphne Burleson, Susan Eisenhower, Joan Johnson-Freese, Roger 
Handberg and Zehn Li, Brian Harvey, John Logsdon, James Clay Moltz, and Asif Siddiqi 
will be referenced.   
John Logsdon is an experienced space policy expert.  He has written many books 
and articles on the 1960s space race and the ISS.  His works include John F. Kennedy 
and the Race to the Moon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the 
National Interest, “Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the 
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Space Station,‖ ―Ten Presidents and NASA,‖ and ―International cooperation in the space 
station programme.‖  As quoted in his most recent book, John F. Kennedy and the Race 
to the Moon: 
I am now inclined to accept an alternative explanation that I rejected forty 
years ago; that the lunar landing decision and the efforts that turned it into 
reality were unique occurrences, a once-in-a-generation, or much longer, 
phenomenon in which a heterogeneous mixture of factors almost 
coincidentally converged to create a national commitment. If this is indeed 
the case, then there is little to learn from the decision to go to the Moon 
relevant to twenty-first century choices.2 
This is quite different from how he ended his 1970 book, The Decision to Go to the 
Moon, in which he stated that the capabilities of Apollo would have a lasting effect on 
humanity.  In The Decision to Go to the Moon, Logsdon ends with Kennedy‘s 
announcement to land a man on the moon and return safely; whereas in John F. Kennedy 
and the Race to the Moon, Logsdon continues to the end of Kennedy‘s presidency.  This 
thesis will take the two contradicting views from Logsdon as well as various other works 
to include speeches and articles from the time period to see what can be learned from the 
space race and the ISS. 
For more in-depth study on the Soviet space program, Asif Siddiqi‘s two 
volumes, The Soviet Space Race with Apollo and Sputnik and The Soviet Space Challenge 
with over 1,000 pages were consulted.  This research provides one of the first 
authoritative sources on the Soviet space program as he had access to material from the 
Soviet archives to include ―official institutional histories, biographies, oral histories, 
memoirs and historical articles.‖3  However, Siddiqi‘s research stopped after Russia‘s 
first thirty years.  Therefore, for a view of more current Russian history, Susan 
Eisenhower‘s Partners in Space: US-Russian Cooperation After the Cold War describes 
the partnership leading to the ISS.  A main theme of her book is the nonproliferation 
concerns, which led the U.S. to include the Russians in the space station project.  This 
                                                 
2 John M. Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 237. 
3 John Berryman, Review of Challenge to Apollo: the Soviet Union and the space race, 1974–1975, by 
Asif A. Siddiqi, Space Policy 18, no. 1 (February 2002), 75. 
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thesis plans to tie in historical and current events of human spaceflight in order to decide 
the road ahead. 
Joan Johnson-Freese has published multiple books and articles on space security 
with particular emphasis on China.  Her works include: Space as a Strategic Asset, 
Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space, The Chinese Space Program: 
A Mystery Within a Maze, and ―Will China overtake America in space?‖  In her book, 
Space as a Strategic Asset, she has a chapter on human spaceflight and describes the 
government‘s lack of enthusiasm for a strong human spaceflight program.  This is 
evident, as mentioned above, in her testimony to the Senate.  She concludes this chapter 
in her book: ‗‗Manned space activity yields benefits in the form of jobs, education, 
technology development, and prestige… What manned spaceflight offers is a soft-power 
strategic alternative to counterbalance some, though not all, of the international fears 
generated by U.S. military ambitions in space.‘‘4 
James Clay Moltz has also published multiple books and articles on space security 
with an emphasis on Asia.  His works include: The Politics of Space Security: Strategic 
Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, Asia's Space Race: National Motivations, 
Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, and ―Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the 
Moon?‖  Moltz‘s The Politics of Space Security reviews the history of the first 50 years 
of space security and presents an argument about the evolving role of great power 
learning regarding the space environment in causing states to exercise restraint, in part in 
order to preserve low-Earth orbit for human spaceflight.  His more recent book, Asia’s 
Space Race, discusses the emerging competition among such rising space powers as 
China, India, Japan, and the two Koreas.  He makes the case that space cooperation has 
been very limited among Asian countries and that human spaceflight has played an 
important role in stimulating both nationalism and regional space competition.  
For more information on the specific countries‘ human spaceflight experiences, 
this thesis draws on a variety of sources, including: Handberg and Li‘s Chinese Space 
Policy: A Study in Domestic and International Politics, Burleson‘s Space Programs 
                                                 
4 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 80. 
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Outside the United States and Harvey‘s The Chinese Space Programme: From 
Conception to Future Capabilities, Europe’s Space Programme: to Ariane and Beyond, 
Russia in Space: The Failed Frontier? and Emerging Space Powers: The New Space 
Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South America (with Henk H.F. Smid, and Theo 
Pirard).  Some of these authors concentrate on a specific country or region, while others 
have provided a broad overview of space programs in general.  This thesis will delve into 
these experts‘ research, concentrating only on their human spaceflight programs or what 
capabilities they currently have that could be used for such missions. 
F. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The thesis will focus on the various national space programs and how they might 
interact and cooperate in the future.  This thesis will be limited to these programs‘ human 
exploration potential and not their whole space programs.  This thesis will only use 
information available in the unclassified realm. 
This thesis intends to answer the research questions by conducting a literature 
review of the 1960s space race, the ISS, and various international space programs with 
emphasis on their human space exploration ambitions.  Recommendations from this 
historical review will be developed based on the most cost-efficient, technically 
expedient, and politically manageable way toward future human exploration of space. 
G. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter II examines a case study of the 1960s space race as an example of 
competition between the U.S. and Russia.  As a case study for a cooperative effort, 
Chapter III discusses the ISS.  For both chapters, a brief historical background will be 
provided as well as the advantages, disadvantages and lessons learned.  Chapter IV 
suggests what the next steps in the human space exploration could be drawing on the 
capabilities of other space-faring countries.  Finally, Chapter V concludes this thesis by 
providing a final analysis and a set of recommendations. 
 6 
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II. THE 1960S SPACE RACE: COMPETITION BETWEEN U.S. 
AND RUSSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 1960s space race is a case of competition leading to a human stepping foot on 
the moon.  During this timeframe, there were attempts at cooperation but these were 
rejected due to the framework of the U.S. and Soviet political/military systems.  Both 
sides of the competition took alternate routes to try and be the first to put a man on the 
moon.  Advantages and disadvantages of this competition were seen by both sides and 
from them lessons for the future can be gleaned. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Russian Space Exploration 
Russia‘s route into space started off quickly with what seemed to be little regard 
to safety.  Unlike their rival, the Soviet‘s space program was simplistic.  Materials like 
stainless steel were used instead of aluminum or titanium as well as simple rocket engines 
that ran on kerosene and liquid oxygen.5  They took the first leap into space and shocked 
the American populace with their launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957. 
Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier during this part of the Cold War, had a 
strategy for initial and spectacular space firsts with little regard to safety or scientific 
importance.6  In Khrushchev‘s mind, ―cooperation in outer space would be impossible as 
long as there was no disarmament.‖7  Because of this mindset, the U.S. attempts for space 
cooperation both publicly from speeches by President Kennedy to more informal 
meetings at the Vienna Summit meeting in June 1961 were not heeded.  In his memoirs, 
it was discovered that the main reason for Khrushchev‘s unwillingness to cooperate was 
                                                 
5 Daphne Burleson, Space Programs Outside the United States (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Company), 224. 
6 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 146. 
7 Quoted in Logsdon, John F. Kennedy, 167. 
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the fear that it would reveal Soviet weakness in intercontinental ballistic missiles at the 
time.8 
The Russian human launch vehicles started with the Vostok capsules, followed 
shortly thereafter by the Voskhod program.  Sergei Korolev and Konstantin Feoktistov 
conceptualized the Vostok spacecraft as early as June 1956.  Construction started in 
January 1958.9  Korolev wrote a document on September 7, 1960 titled ―Basic Status of 
the Development and Preparation of the Object 3KA (The Piloted Space Ship ‗Vostok-
3A‘)‖10 which spurred state-level interest into the program.  Only three days later, 
according to Siddiqi: 
[T]he ten most powerful leaders in the Soviet defense industry…along 
with the six original core members of the Council of Chief Designers, 
signed and sent a document on the Vostok program to the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party….Unlike all earlier Soviet space 
projects, the fact that this document was signed by ministerial heads rather 
than the standard deputy ministers clearly underlines the importance with 
which the Soviet leadership viewed the program.11 
Another spectacular space first occurred on April 12, 1961, with the world‘s first piloted 
space mission of a single orbit totaling 108 minutes around the Earth by Yuri Gagarin.  It 
was later discovered that the Vostok spacecraft piloted by Gagarin actually had a 
malfunction, which could have resulted in his death.12 
Vostok had no maneuvering capability and the cosmonauts had to parachute to 
safety at the end of flight, a fact that the Soviets concealed for a long time because 
manned landing was required to be eligible for world space records by the Fédération 
Aéronautique Internationale (FAI).13  Over the next few years, Russia chalked up 
additional space firsts, putting the Americans always a few steps behind.  In 1962, the 
                                                 
8 Logsdon, John F. Kennedy, 160–168. 
9 Burleson, Space Programs, 236. 
10 Asif A. Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge (FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 
254. 
11 Ibid., 254–255. 
12 Andrew Chaikin, ―Greatest Space Events of the 20th Century: The 60s,‖ Space.com, December 27, 
1999, http://www.space.com/news/spacehistory/greatest_space_events_1960s.html. 
13 Burleson, Space Programs, 235. 
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first day-long flight was achieved by Cosmonaut Gherman Titov.  The first dual 
spaceflight was accomplished in 1963 with Andriyan Nikolayev in Vostok 3 and Pavel 
Popovich in Vostok 4.  Valentina Tereskhkova became the first woman in space in 
1963.14 
After only six missions, Vostok was cancelled in 1964 for a modified Vostok 
design designated Voskhod.15  Voskhod was also short lived, as it was developed in nine 
months and only had two missions.16  Once again, safety was overlooked as the 1964 
maiden flight of the Voskhod launched three cosmonauts into space.  The Voskhod was 
actually a Vostok without ejection seats, escape tower, or spacesuits to make additional 
room.17  Luckily, there were no problems with this flight. 
However, Pavel Belyayev and Alexei Leonov in Voskhod 2 had difficulties on the 
first spacewalk.  Leonov‘s suit inflated, causing him to be unable to climb back into the 
cabin.  In a desperate attempt, he reduced the air pressure in his suit, allowing him to 
squeeze back in.18  As Leonov described the situation: 
Near the end of my walk I realized that my feet had pulled out of my shoes 
and my hands had pulled away from my gloves.  My entire suit stretched 
so much that my hands and feet appeared to shrink.  I was unable to 
control them.  It was as if I had never tried the suit on even once…I 
couldn‘t get back in straightaway.  My space suit had ballooned out and 
the pressure was quite considerable.  I was tired and couldn‘t go in feet 
first as I had been taught to do.  But using a valve…I decreased the 
pressure to just under 0.27 atmospheres.  Then I felt freer and I could 
move about more easily.  Then I pushed myself into the airlock head first, 
with my arms holding the rails.  I had to turn myself upside down in the 
air lock in order to enter the ship feet first and this was very difficult.19 
This marked the last first the Soviets would have in the race to the moon.  The 
Voskhod program was cancelled after Sergei Korolev‘s death and plans were shifted to 
                                                 
14 Chaikin, Greatest Space. 
15 Burleson, Space Programs, 236. 
16 Ibid., 237. 
17 Ibid., 236. 
18 Ibid., 237. 
19 Quoted in Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet, 456. 
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Soyuz.  A few years later, the Soviets‘ luck ran out.  In April 1967, the parachute on the 
Soyuz 1 failed to deploy killing Vladimir Komarov.20  This would set the Soviets‘ lunar 
program back 18 months.21 
Two significant changes in the Soviet space program would alter its direction and 
slow the pace, giving the moon to the Americans.  In October 1964, Khrushchev was 
removed from office by a coup led by Leonid Brezhnev.  This cost the lunar space 
program a strong government ally.22  Brezhev had different ideas when it came to space, 
mainly shifts toward new military programs.  In particular, possible nuclear missile 
strikes aimed at the U.S., launching at its unprotected southern border as well as an anti-
satellite (ASAT) system.  The other change that slowed down the Soviet moon effort was 
the sudden death of Sergei Korolev, one of the Soviets‘ lead rocket designers.  His death 
left a leadership gap that his successor was unable to fulfill with increasing press from the 
U.S.23  As Siddiqi describes it: ―As a manager, designer, politician, lobbyist, engineer, 
and flight director, he had carved out a position for himself that defied any singular title.  
Each one of the responsibilities that he had carried on his shoulders was vacant.  His 
successors would try to fill the vacuum, but in truth, things would never be the same 
again.‖24 
2. United States Space Exploration 
Unlike the Russians, who took a running start to the space race, the U.S. had a 
slightly different initial view on this space competition.  The Eisenhower administration 
actually didn‘t view it as a race of space programs at all.  President Eisenhower believed 
that the accomplishment of Sputnik I was not one of space achievement, but as an 
achievement in their rockets.  Therefore, Eisenhower focused funding toward 
accelerating U.S. ballistic missile programs especially in the area of hardening against 
                                                 
20 Chaikin, Greatest Space. 
21 Burleson, Space Programs, 237–238. 
22 Ibid., 225. 
23 Moltz, The Politics of Space, 155–157. 
24 Siddiqi, Sputnik and the Soviet, 516. 
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attack.  With this budgetary concentration on missile programs, funding for other 
programs was kept as low as possible, including space programs.25 
Just a few months before Gagarin‘s historic voyage, an advisory committee was 
formed to justify putting a human into space.  The President's Science Advisory 
Committee stated on December 1960, 
We have been plunged into a race for the conquest of outer space. As a 
reason for this undertaking some look to the new and exciting scientific 
discoveries which are certain to be made. Others feel the challenge to 
transport man beyond frontiers he scarcely dared dream about until now. 
But at present the most impelling reason for our effort has been the 
international political situation which demands that we demonstrate our 
technological capabilities if we are to maintain our position of leadership. 
For all of these reasons we have embarked on a complex and costly 
adventure.26 
This committee concluded that ―It seems, therefore, to us at the present time that man-in-
space cannot be justified on purely scientific grounds, although more thought may show 
that there are situations for which this is not true.  On the other hand, it may be argued 
that much of the motivation and drive for the scientific exploration of space is derived 
from the dream of man's getting into space himself.‖27  Without additional justification in 
December 1960, it didn‘t seem likely that the U.S. was going to try to put a man into 
space at all, let alone to the moon. 
Gagarin‘s flight in April 1961 made way for a ―full-scale inquiry which would be 
necessary before a final and precise decision could be made.‖28  However, this historical 
flight also ―demonstrated to the President the importance of going ahead with an all-out 
space effort.‖29  The sentiment under the Kennedy administration had changed.  May 5, 
1961, exemplified this new attitude with America‘s first space flight piloted by astronaut 
Alan B. Shepard, Jr., lasting 14.8 minutes.  The American people were now invested in 
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this race.  A new deadline was set just days after Shepard became the first American in 
space by President John F. Kennedy‘s famous speech.  ―…I believe that this nation 
should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on 
the Moon and returning him safely to the earth.‖30 
On multiple occasions in his early speeches as president, Kennedy urged the 
Soviet Union for cooperation in space.  The motivation for cooperation with the Soviets 
was of personal and diplomatic interest to President Kennedy in the hope that it would 
alleviate much of the tensions between the two countries and therefore the global tensions 
as well.31  ―Together let us explore the stars…‖ Kennedy stated in his Inaugural 
Address.32  On the day of Gagarin‘s flight, Kennedy sent a congratulatory telegram to 
Khrushchev again asking for cooperation ―it is my sincere desire that in the continuing 
quest for knowledge of outer space our nations can work together…‖33  However, these 
efforts were mostly ignored by the Soviets at the time.  But ten other nations did express 
their desire to take part in this endeavor, allowing the U.S. to ―reinforce our old alliances 
and build new ones.‖34 
Unlike the change in leadership for the Soviets, President Kennedy‘s 
assassination and Johnson‘s presidency helped accelerate the U.S. space program.  
President Johnson had already made a name for himself as a proponent of the space 
competition and with that, his space policy as president gave a strong commitment and 
drive to the U.S. manned space program as the international leader.35  President Johnson 
was not going to modify Kennedy‘s goal of the lunar landing and turned it into a 
memorial for him.36  Cooperation was going to take a back seat to this reinvigorated U.S. 
drive. 
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The U.S. caught up fast with its first spacewalk aboard Gemini’s second mission, 
occurring only a couple months after the Russians.  However, tragedy also struck the 
Americans in 1967, when three astronauts were killed aboard Apollo 1 during a routine 
test.  After almost two full years of testing and enhanced safety measures, the first Apollo 
mission took flight with astronauts Walter M. Schirra, Jr., Donn F. Eisele, and Walter 
Cunningham, whose mission it was to test this new hardware in Earth orbit.37 
Christmas Eve 1968 was an emotional and historic day as the astronauts aboard 
Apollo 8 circled the moon for the first time reading from the first book of the Bible and 
sending back video of the Earth from lunar orbit.  This proved to the world that the U.S. 
had not only caught up to the Soviets, but had far surpassed them.  Finally, on July 16, 
1969, Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. Aldrin stepped foot on the surface of the moon.38  
―One small step for man; one giant leap for mankind.‖  Neil Armstrong‘s quote, as he 
became the first person to set foot on the moon, ended the 1960s space race between the 
U.S. and the Soviets.   
C. ADVANTAGES 
The main advantage of a space race was the fact that this was a competition.  
Today, the deadline of putting a man on the moon in nine years almost seems 
unachievable.  This was exactly the point, to do an unthinkable feat before the Soviets.  
This would have the symbolic value of demonstrating technological leadership, as well as 
military power.  The Soviets and the U.S. were not only fighting to be the first to put a 
man on the moon, but to prove to the world that their form of government was superior 
and therefore better choice for alliance.39  As President John F. Kennedy stated ―We 
choose to go to the Moon in this decade… not because they are easy, but because they are 
hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and 
skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to 
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postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others, too.‖40  With the politics 
involved and the backing of the American populace, this deadline became achievable.  
Many journalists of the day agreed, it was setting the mind to the task and concentration 
in effort and control that assured the success.41  As Johnson-Freese wrote ―Only 
commitment from the office of the president—first Kennedy, and then Johnson—
maintained because of the program‘s strategic goal of beating the Soviets, ensured that 
Congress maintained support for long enough to guarantee success.‖42 
The concentration of effort was exactly what NASA was hoping for in 1961 when 
it told President Kennedy that it was feasible to get a man to the moon within the decade.  
The stipulation was policy approval and adequate funding because scientists already 
believed the technology would be there.  The Low Committee, a task force established to 
define NASA‘s manned lunar landing program, concluded that ―no invention or 
breakthrough is believed to be required to insure the over-all feasibility of safe lunar 
flight.‖43  With this increase in technology and funding, came thousands of new jobs.  
NASA‘s budget was astronomically large, but on the other hand so was the number of 
jobs needed.  As L. C. McHugh wrote, ―in fact the entire space industry, which formally 
came into being less than five years ago, has already given rise to five thousand 
companies or research organizations.  Moreover, if NASA officials guess correctly on the 
lunar venture, this ambitious feat will require the mobilization of an army of four hundred 
thirty-five thousand people, and its hardware requirements will ultimately involve ten 
thousand firms.‖44  President Johnson received almost everything he asked from 
Congress for NASA because of the jobs this program produced as well as ―nobody 
wanted to draw attention to funding going for a program without widespread public 
support.‖45 
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A surprising advantage was the bettering of the education system.  When Sputnik 
was launched, it not only jumpstarted a space race but an education race as well.  As 
Logsdon wrote, ―Soviet space successes had prompted a reevaluation of American 
education and technology; they brought to the surface many unsolved problems and 
unsatisfied demands in virtually all sectors of American society.‖46  As a result, sciences 
such as physics became emphasized at a younger age.  Language studies in Russian and 
Chinese were also made more available and to younger students.  This revamp of the U.S. 
education system began in 1958, in which the human space race helped in speeding it 
up.47 
D. DISADVANTAGES 
With time being the driver of the space race, safety was not.  Because of the 
imperative to win, corners were cut.  This was evident in both space programs with 
numerous malfunctions and unfortunate deaths.  The Russians had malfunctions ranging 
from suit failures to a failed parachute.  They also took shortcuts such as sending three 
men into space without ejection seats or spacesuits.  According to Moltz, ―Part of the 
pressure for haste had led to a disastrous explosion on October 24, 1960, at Baikonur, 
which killed the new head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Field Marshal Mitrovan I. 
Nedelin, and 126 scientists, engineers, and soldiers working at the site.‖48  The 
Americans also had their share of close calls.  John Glenn manually flew the last two of 
his three orbits due to a failure of his autopilot.  Apollo 13‘s mission changed from 
landing on the surface of the moon to getting the crew home alive after an oxygen tank 
rupture.  With the loss of human life by both parties, the true cost of the competition was 
felt. 
―Reinventing the wheel‖ sums up the duplicative efforts of the two nations to put 
a man on the moon.  Two of everything was needed.  Two rockets, two space programs, 
two budgets.  Therefore it can be estimated that twice the cost and manpower was used.  
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With everything kept a deep secret to ensure the success of their own program, the United 
States and Russia were not learning from each others‘ successes and failures.  The U.S. 
actually had its own duplication on its space efforts between the Army, Air Force and 
NASA.  The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force sent out a memorandum in 1961 
stating that ―for the sake of operational effectiveness and to avoid wasteful duplication‖ 
there needs to be an ―interdependent team effort.‖49 
Taking place due in part to the Cold War, tensions were so high between these 
two competitors that everything became a race.  Not only was there the space race, but 
education became a competition.  A nuclear arms race was also brewing with ―an 
increasing danger that space may become man‘s newest battlefield,‖ according to U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1962.50 
This idea of space as a battleground caused fear should the U.S. lose this race.  
The moon itself could become the ultimate ―high ground‖ and lead to the ―ultimate 
domination of the solar system.‖51  Senior military officers actually called for a lunar 
missile base in 1958; a base that would be able to deploy nuclear weapons.52  Some U.S. 
military men saw this as a national-defense measure.53  The reasoning became that the 
U.S. must get to the moon first, or the Soviets would be the ones building a base.  
According to McHugh, ―For all we know, it may indeed be true that the imponderable 
value of scientific prestige, coupled with the unknown military potential of outer space, 
will lead directly to dominion over the earth.‖54 
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E. LESSONS LEARNED 
The nuclear arms race in space and the negative effects of orbital nuclear tests 
from 1958 to 1962 actually created the most noteworthy lesson learned.  Realizing the 
harmful effects on satellites of electro-magnetic pulse radiation of the two countries took 
an ―unprecedented step of beginning to narrow considerably the permitted avenues of 
military space competition through a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements.‖55  
These agreements included the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. 
In President John F. Kennedy‘s Address before the 18th General Assembly of the 
United Nations on September 20, 1963, he stated: 
Today we may have reached a pause in the Cold War—but that is not a 
lasting peace. A test ban treaty is a milestone—but it is not the 
millennium. … But if we can stretch this pause into a period of 
cooperation—if both sides can now gain new confidence and experience 
in concrete collaborations for peace—if we can now be as bold and 
farsighted in the control of deadly weapons as we have been in their 
creation—then surely this first small step can be the start of a long and 
fruitful journey.56 
This was only the first step.  Three months later a UN resolution was issued creating a 
basis for the Outer Space Treaty, which created the basis for international space law in 
1967.57 
F. CONCLUSION 
The mentality of the 1960s space race was mainly one of competition, national 
pride and relative gain.  The political tensions between the U.S. and Russia propelled 
them each to try to be the first country to put a man on the moon, which they believed 
would assist their ultimate victory in the broader Cold War struggle.   
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This complex and costly adventure started with Sputnik and many firsts on the 
Soviets‘ part.  But by 1969, the U.S. had caught up and surpassed the Soviets with the 
greatest achievement of placing a man on the moon.  Below is a table highlighting the 
firsts in this space race. 
Table 1.   Timetable of Space Events: 1960s58 
Achievement Country Crew Spacecraft Launch Date 
First human in space Soviet Union Gagarin Vostok 1 April 12, 1961 









Vostok 2 August 6, 1961 







Voskhod 1 October 12, 1964 
First spacewalk Soviet Union 
Belyayev, 
Leonov 














Apollo 11 July 16, 1969 
 
                                                 
58 Chaikin, Greatest Space Events. 
 19 
With the first lunar landing, came the perception that the U.S. had won this space 
race.  The Soviets did not continue to strive for the moon because they did not want to 
take the risks or the expense ―since the Americans had already taken the big prize.‖59  
Thoughts of further lunar exploration were put aside.  Similar thoughts were true in the 
U.S.  NASA‘s budget was cut drastically as was the Apollo program.  According to 
Logsdon ―The program had enough forward momentum to carry it through six more 
missions, but Apollo was conceived as a closed-end effort to beat the USSR to the Moon, 
not as the first step in a long-term, sustainable program of space exploration.‖60 
From these first steps during the 1960s space race, advantages and disadvantages 
led to important lessons learned.  As a 1969 NASA report summarized: 
The landing on the Moon has captured the imagination of the world. It is 
now abundantly clear to the man in the street, as well as to the political 
leaders of the world, that mankind now has at his service a new 
technological capability, an important characteristic of which is that its 
applicability transcends national boundaries. If we retain the identification 
of the world with our space program, we have on opportunity for 
significant political effects on nations and peoples and on their 
relationships to each other, which in the long run may be quite profound.61 
The outcome of the 1960s space race was actually to stop the competitive mind-set and to 
initiate the seeds of cooperation. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: A COOPERATIVE 
EFFORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of international cooperation regarding space exploration was not a new 
concept that came out of the 1970s détente era.  NASA was created with this in mind.  
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, which formed NASA had a clause that 
mandated this new space agency to engage in ―cooperation…with other nations and 
groups of nations.‖62,63 
Early attempts at cooperation include U.S.-European collaboration with Spacelab, 
while Canada was commissioned to construct the Remote Manipulator System, or 
Canadarm, on the shuttle.  Known as the ―handshake in space,‖ the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
was the first international manned spaceflight.64  This mission occurred in July 1975 and 
its success enhanced space relations between the U.S. and the USSR, which would 
eventually lead to future cooperation on the ISS.65  Following this mission, President 
Ford predicted ―the day is not far off when space missions made possible by this first 
joint effort will be more or less commonplace.‖66 
Therefore, when discussion of building a space station began in the late 1970s, 
there was motivation to build it cooperatively due in part to the Space Act and previous 
cooperation attempts as well as cost concerns.  In President Reagan‘s State of the Union 
Address on January 25, 1984, he made it abundantly clear that building a space station 
was the next great step in space and that it could not be done without international 
support. 
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A space station will permit quantum leaps in our research in science, 
communications, in metals, and in lifesaving medicines which could be 
manufactured only in space. We want our friends to help us meet these 
challenges and share in their benefits. NASA will invite other countries to 
participate so we can strengthen peace, build prosperity, and expand 
freedom for all who share our goals.67 
This invitation was not given or taken lightly, and the groundwork was already in place 
thanks to initial meetings.  Accordingly, during the late spring to early summer of 1985, 
Canada, Japan and Europe (under ESA) formally agreed to partner with the U.S. in what 
is now the most extensive international technical project ever undertaken.68 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Well before President Reagan‘s invitation and decree to build a space station, 
NASA had been setting the framework.  In the post-Apollo era, it became evident that the 
major human spaceflight efforts were all now being considered as international 
partnerships,69 and the U.S. did alter its approach to cooperation to one that involved real 
participation instead of just data exchange and launch services.  There were concerns on 
how sophisticated other spacefaring nations were and therefore whether or not to provide 
them access to sensitive or proprietary technology which then might be used to compete 
with the U.S.70  Even with these concerns, NASA asked Europe, Canada, Japan, (and 
much later the Russians) to participate in this new space era. 
A permanent human presence in space with a station was perceived as the next 
logical step.  In a change from earlier policy, NASA involved potential partners at a very 
early stage in the program.  This early involvement allowed these potential partners‘ 
inputs to help influence NASA as well as aid it in understanding from the beginning what 
their roles would be.  As early as 1982, representatives from Europe, Canada, and Japan 
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were called together for a status update and a discussion of potential participation.71  
There would be negotiations about long-term use as well as hardware development.  
Nowhere was it mentioned about who would manage the station.72 
The reason there was no mention of who would manage the space station was that 
NASA had already taken on this role by decreeing that the U.S. would develop a space 
station capable of functioning on its own.  This meant that operationally, right from the 
start, Europe, Japan and Canada had to accept a junior role and become dependent on the 
U.S.  However, the original principles declared that all station elements would be open to 
all participants with no jurisdiction issues.73  The decision to proceed by the international 
community was taken on the belief that because of the presidentially initiated invitation 
to cooperate, this program would have to have the political and financial support required 
for mutual success.74 
In late spring and early summer of 1985, the original potential partners (Europe, 
Canada and Japan) for this space station entered into three Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOU).  The MOUs were to be the framework for cooperation as far as detailing the 
technical aspects as well as the managerial arrangements of the partnership.  However, 
the MOUs were not as binding of a commitment as the potential international partners 
wanted from the U.S.  Yet, on that basis on September 29, 1988, the parties reached a 30-
year Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) for the space station.75  Europe, Canada, and 
Japan treated the IGA as a treaty.  On the other hand, the U.S. Congress did not formally 
commit to any of the provisions in the IGA.  Due to this, there was no means to force the 
U.S. to honor its commitments in the MOUs or IGA if funding was not provided by 
Congress.76 
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The Europeans were split on their decision to press forward with the U.S.  They 
wanted to be a partner in this endeavor in order to have more of a voice in the 
management of the station and a guarantee that the U.S. would not back out.  But there 
were also those in Europe that wanted a longer-term policy of developing their own 
autonomous capabilities.  This hesitation can be traced back to the Europeans‘ previous 
displeasure with the outcome of its Symphonie satellite.  The International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) is an organization ―whose main 
objective is to provide a commercial basis, the ‗space segment‘ for international public 
telecommunications services.‖77  Originally, the U.S. Communications Satellite 
Corporation (COMSAT) had 61% of the system with Europe only having 30.5%.78  The 
Franco-German designed Symphonie was seen as a threat to INTELSAT and as Europe 
did not have a launcher of its own, it had to agree that Symphonie would only be used for 
experimental and not commercial purposes in order for the Americans to launch it.79  
This led to the ESA‘s decision to develop the Ariane launcher family in July 1973, so as 
to no longer have to rely on another country for launch capabilities.80 
Ultimately, Europe entered into the space station negotiations with less than full 
faith in the partnership‘s set of conditions for cooperation.  ESA would contribute three 
elements to the space station, together known as the Columbus program.  These elements 
were a permanently attached pressurized module (APM), a polar platform, and a man-
tended free flyer (MTFF), capable of autonomous operation for periods of six months or 
longer.81 
Like ESA, Japan planned to contribute multiple elements.  The purpose of its 
elements involved scientific research in the fields of microgravity and materials 
processing.  The Japanese Experiment Module (JEM), nicknamed Kibo, would consist of 
                                                 
77 Joan Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space (Malabar, FL: Orbit 
Book, 1990), 17. 
78 Ibid., 18. 
79 Brian Harvey, Europe’s Space Programme: To Ariane and Beyond (Chichester, United Kingdom: 
Springer, 2003), 160. 
80 Burleson, Space Programs, 98. 
81 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic, 178. 
 25 
a logistics module, a pressurized research module, and an exposed section.82  Based on its 
partnership, Japan intended to have a permanent Japanese presence in space, hoping to 
always have a Japanese astronaut as one of the six member permanent crew originally 
planned.83 
Canada was called on again for its advanced robotics.  Unlike the other partners, 
Canada would not be contributing a module.  Its contribution was the system that would 
assemble all the modules together to form the station, called the Mobile Servicing System 
(MSS).  The MSS consists of a long robotic arm used for the construction (known as the 
Canadarm2), a two-armed robotic handyman used for maintenance (known as Dextre), 
and the Mobile Base used as a work platform (which moves on rails and can be used for 
storage).84 
But the early 1990s were laden with problems, funding being the main 
contributor.  The partners were falling behind schedule and over budget, repeatedly 
forcing design downsizing.  The design was too complicated.  It was too heavy.  It 
provided too little power.  The political commitment in the U.S. was weak.  Due to all of 
this, the timeline and the design for the ISS constantly had to be rewritten.85  With all the 
rewrites, it became apparent that the budget allocated for the construction of the station 
was inadequate. 
When President Bill Clinton took office in January 1993, he was advised to cancel 
the space station program because it was over budget and behind schedule.86  As Dan 
Goldin, NASA Administrator, recalled ―Panetta [President Clinton‘s budget director] told 
me that the President campaigned on the economy, we have to cut the budget, and the 
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space station solves the problem.‖87  Goldin sought alternatives to cancellation, with one 
solution being an invitation to the Russians to join the program.  The Soviet Union had 
dissolved in December 1991 and the new government was no longer communist.  But the 
Russians were in a similar situation with its Mir-2 space station.88  With the Russians‘ 
experience, having them join the space station program would save time and money.  In 
an interview in May 1993, the chief manager of the Mir-2 project, Leonid Gorshkov 
commented ―When space budgets are being reduced around the world, even the richest 
country would have trouble financing its space program.  Coordinated implementation of 
Freedom and Mir 2 could help to reduce the financial burden on all of their participants 
and increase the efficiency of future stations.‖89 
However, there were caveats before the Russians became official partners.  
President Clinton did not cancel the space station program because Dan Goldin linked the 
space station with Clinton‘s foreign policy of preventing Russian scientists from 
proliferating weapons to U.S. enemies.90  President Clinton was more interested in the 
non-proliferation impacts of a Russian-U.S. space project.91  On July 16, 1993, a Russian 
delegation in Washington signed two agreements.  The first was that Russia agreed not to 
transfer cryogenic technology to India.  The second agreement was to adhere to the 
Missile Technology Control Regime.  In exchange, Russia would be permitted to conduct 
eight commercial launches of American-made satellites as well as be paid $400 million 
for specific space cooperation activities.92  This would symbolize a new post-Cold War 
and post-Soviet relationship with Russia.93  As Susan Eisenhower describes it: 
―Nonproliferation has been an important but ‗silent‘ success of space cooperation…The 
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decision to engage the Russians assured the employment of countless rocket engineers in 
this cooperation eliminating the temptation to sell their services of their expertise to 
regimes hostile to the United States….‖94 
Therefore in the winter of 1993, in order to save both programs, the United States 
invited Russia to join the original partners.95  A single space station became the 
developmental plan with the Russian inclusion and the modules from Europe and Japan, 
thus changing the name from Freedom to the ISS.  In his State of the Union address on 
January 25, 1994, President Clinton highlighted international space cooperation by saying 
―This is a promising moment.  Instead of building weapons in space, Russian scientists 
will help us build the International Space Station.‖96 
But Russia becoming a full partner in the space station program was a decision 
made without consultation to the original partners.  In March 1993, the international 
partners were represented on the Station Redesign Team authorized by the Clinton 
administration.  Their report was that ―new opportunities for Russian participants should 
be considered‖ as well as ―consideration may be given to greater use of…the Russian Mir 
space station.‖97  After that, it was not until October 1993 that they were formally 
informed about the intention to invite Russia to join.98  Europeans took this as the U.S. 
attempting to undermine their capabilities.  Japan, wanting to ease U.S. criticism of its 
trade surplus, supported the decision.99  The partners were reassured that 75 percent of 
the hardware designed for Freedom would still be used.  However, it became very evident 
that the U.S. and Russia were now the senior partners, much to the chagrin of the other 
original partners.100 
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Five years later, in November 1998, Russia launched the first module for the 
station program into space aboard a Proton rocket.  The Russian-built Zarya control 
module became the first segment of the ISS to orbit, 14 years after the space station 
program was first announced in 1984.101  At the turn of the century, the first occupying 
crew arrived.  Below is a table highlighting the major achievements on the ISS assembly. 




Spacecraft Launch Date 
Zarya Control Module - 
battery power and fuel storage 
1 A/R 









December 4, 1998 
Zvezda Service Module 1R 
Russian Proton 
rocket 
July 12, 2000 
The first crew to live and work 
aboard the International Space 
Station. 
2R Soyuz spacecraft October 30, 2000 
P-6 Truss - supports the first 






Destiny Laboratory Module 5A 
Space Shuttle 
Atlantis  
February 7, 2001 
Italian-built Leonardo Multi-





March 8, 2001 





April 19, 2001 
Joint Airlock - Russian and 





July 12, 2001 
Cargo crane and the Russian 
Pirs Docking Compartment - 
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Spacecraft Launch Date 
S0-Truss and the Mobile 
Transporter - gives extra mobility 




April 8, 2002 
Mobile Base System - completing 




June 5, 2002 
Harmony Node 2 10A 
Space Shuttle 
Discovery 
October 23, 2007 





February 7, 2008 
Experiment Logistics Module- 
first pressurized component of the 
Japanese Kibo laboratory.  Dextre 




March 11, 2008 
Pressurized Module and robotic 





May 31, 2008 
Starboard 6 (S6) - final major 
U.S. truss segment and its final 





March 15, 2009 
Kibo Japanese Experiment 
Module Exposed Facility and 
Experiment Logistics Module 
Exposed Section - "front porch" 
for experiments in the exposed 
environment and a robotic arm 





July 15, 2009 
Lightweight Multi-Purpose 





August 28, 2009 
Mini-Research Module-2 
(MRM2) - serves as an additional 
docking port for Russian vehicles, 
as an airlock for Russian-based 
spacewalks and as a platform for 









Spacecraft Launch Date 
Node 3, named Tranquility - 
pressurized module that provides 





February 8, 2010 
Integrated Cargo Carrier and 
the Russian-built Mini-Research 
Module-1 (MRM1) - provides 
cargo storage and an additional 




May 14, 2010 
Permanent Multipurpose 
Module Leonardo and the 
EXPRESS Logistics Carrier 4 as 
well as Robonaut 2, a human 
upper torso-like robot that could be 





February 24, 2011 
 
But with each new U.S. president, there was anticipation and anxiety over what 
the new administration‘s space policy concerning the ISS would be, specifically for the 
international partners.  On January 14, 2004, President George Bush introduced his 
Vision for Space Exploration (VSE).  With this vision, there would have to be a new 
cooperative approach to human space exploration in order to pursue ―the Moon, Mars, 
and beyond.‖103  Once again, funding became a concern, for the station already had a 
tight budget and now would have to compete with President Bush‘s vision.104  There was 
fear that the ISS would become victim to the new priority of the human spaceflight 
vision.  According to Johnson-Freese, the money would ―come through retiring the 
shuttle in 2010 and limiting ISS use to only tasks related to returning to the moon, freeing 
up money previously planned for those programs.‖105  On the other hand, this vision was 
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also met with some jealousy from other space agencies that once again human spaceflight 
had jumped to the forefront of the U.S. president‘s agenda.106 
At the end of 2005, the international players in the ISS no longer had to fear when 
the budget decision was finally made to complete assembly on the ISS before retiring the 
space shuttle in 2010, therefore maintaining the U.S. commitment to the project.107  But, 
in 2006, the ISS assembly plan was significantly reduced to 16 flights and revised to stop 
the conduct of research on the ISS after 2016.  The international partners, specifically 
Russia and Japan, made it clear that they wished to operate the ISS facilities well after 
2016.  In January 2009, there was the worry again that a new president and 
administration might once again amend the ISS assembly and usage plan significantly.108 
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama‘s ideas about space policy appeared to 
change drastically, perhaps reflecting his own steep learning curve on the subject.  
Originally, in November 2007, Obama‘s plan was to cut NASA‘s budget over the next 
five years in order to fund his early education initiative.109  This led to questions about 
the future of NASA‘s Constellation program or the continued use of the ISS if Obama 
were to win the election.  In 2008, Obama published a white paper to clarify his space 
policy entitled ―Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration.‖110  In this paper, he 
announced his ―goal of sending human missions to the Moon by 2020, as a precursor in 
an orderly progression to missions to more distant destinations, including Mars.‖111  In 
addition, the paper also included accelerating the shuttle‘s successor and completing the 
ISS with the potential of use beyond 2016.112  Now the only question became, if Obama 
was elected president, would he implement this policy? 
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President Obama commissioned Norman Augustine, former Lockheed Martin 
CEO and Chairman, to lead a committee of space experts in the spring of 2009 to 
research viable options for the path ahead in the human spaceflight program.  The 
commission was entitled ―Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee,‖ but was 
commonly known as the Augustine Commission.113  While waiting for the Augustine 
Report, the debate still continued on whether the Constellation Program—with Ares 1 
and 5 along with Orion—or an expendable shuttle-derived rocket would be the shuttle‘s 
replacement.114  Either way, it was speculated that the technology was here but the 
political will or ―economic vitality‖ was debatable.115  Augustine said ―I think money 
probably is going to be the deciding factor of what one can afford to do—more so than 
technology.‖116 
In October 2009, the Augustine Report was published, giving five options for the 
way ahead.  These options are summarized in Table 3. 
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The first two options presented were within the constraints that President Obama 
had given the committee in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget. Sally Ride, a member of 
the committee, said: ―This budget is just simply not friendly to exploration (…).  It‘s very 
difficult to find an exploration scenario that actually fits within this very restrictive 
budget guidance.‖118  Therefore, the committee came up with the remaining three options 
with fewer constraints.  It appeared the committee was leaning toward Option 5, the 
Flexible Plan.  This plan would include NASA working more with other nations and U.S. 
commercial assets.119  Augustine stated ―We very much like the deep space option (…). 
It‘s…doable and viable.‖120  The conclusion of the report indicated that if the human 
space program had more stringent budgetary constraints, then the U.S. would have to set 
lower, less grand goals with the potential of losing its lead in space.  The report also 
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indicated that NASA needed to be able to manage itself and get back to the reason it was 
created: technological developments and research in new concepts instead of being ―its 
own supplier.‖121 
A few months after the Augustine Report, President Obama‘s FY 2011 budget 
cancelled the Constellation Program.122  The Russians publicly backed Obama‘s 
cancellation of the Constellation, as he committed the United States to operate the ISS 
through 2020, paying for it partly through savings from the Constellation program.123  
Constellation was officially terminated on June 10, 2011.124 
Instead of the moon, President Obama has set his sights on sending human space 
exploration farther into the inner solar system and to asteroids.125  His ―bold‖ new space 
policy indicated the need for international cooperation ―more than ever‖ and focuses on 
―tapping‖ commercial industry.126  The extended U.S. commitment to the ISS, the 
Constellation program‘s cut, and the space shuttle‘s last flight on July 8,2011 have made 
international cooperation even more crucial, with the sole means of getting to the ISS 
now being Russian rockets. 
C. ADVANTAGES 
The motives behind international collaboration on the ISS highlight the 
advantages of cooperation.  This was a political decision and a positive sign of U.S. 
interest in further human space exploration becoming a global undertaking.127  Each 
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country deemed this field of science as worthy of pursuing as well as saw the potential 
for important technological development in industry.128 
Cooperation on the ISS can be seen as a means of closing gaps between nations.  
This project serves U.S. foreign policy and enhances relations by working together on an 
enormous challenge.  Specifically, the Clinton administration linked its foreign policy 
goals of nonproliferation to having Russia join the project.  The political decision to 
cooperate can be broken down into two advantages.  First, by cooperating, the U.S. 
created a positive image in the international arena.  Along similar lines, secondly, it 
strengthened the perception of U.S. openness to outside nations.129 
By pooling efforts, there would be savings on both human resources and financial 
means needed to tackle such a project.130  In seeking international cooperation, the U.S. 
expanded the investment for the ISS beyond that committed by one country alone.  The 
international investment also improved the balance of trade.131  Financial contributions 
from international partners not only enhanced the scope of the station but also increased 
support with the U.S. administration and Congress.132  As far as overall monetary costs, 
cooperation typically increases the total cost.  According to Johnson-Freese: 
A rule of thumb is that overall cost increases by about one-third due to 
management and interface expenses.  Communication channels must be 
established; technical and legal teams assembled and exchanged, often for 
prolonged periods (all of the ISS partners have long had offices at Johnson 
Space Center); and hardware built to specifications compatible with other 
hardware, and transported.  However, cooperative programs should also 
have greater capabilities, because more partners are contributing and the 
cost to individual countries to access those capabilities will be 
proportionally less.133 
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The estimated financial contributions of each country to the ISS as of 2010 are 
listed in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Space Station Total Costs as of 2010134 
Country 
Cost (in billions of 
$US) 
Percent 
U.S. 72 84 
Russia 12 8 
Europe 5 3.3 
Japan 5 3.3 
Canada 2 1.3 
This puts the total cost for the ISS at $100 billion in 2010.  The above amounts do 
not include the shuttle or other launch costs.  It is estimated that each shuttle launch costs 
roughly $1.5 billion each.135  According to the NASA website, as of June 2013, there 
have been 89 Russian launches, 37 Space Shuttle launches, 3 Japanese HTVs, and 3 
European ATVs supplying the ISS.136  However, when analyzing the cost-benefit 
analysis of the ISS, non-market valuation needs to be considered.  According to Seth D. 
Baum, ―Non-market valuation is thus, in a sense, a means of quantifying seemingly 
qualitative values.‖137  As Eligar Sadeh summarizes, ―The symbolic dimension, which 
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includes prestige, legitimacy, influence and international accountability, frames the 
nature of the cooperation realized for the ISS program.‖138 
Repetition in technological research, once a disadvantage for competing 
countries, is now an advantage in cooperation.  There is an intellectual effort applied in 
scientific and technological objectives across the spectrum of the partners, increasing the 
chance of reaching an answer in less time.  Instead of duplicating experiments in space, 
international scientists can develop different but complementary ones.  These 
complementary experiments and objectives ensure that the international partners are 
contributing to a single goal.139  Also, allowing each country to provide technology in 
areas of its greatest experience and expertise led to a more rational division of station 
components and requirements.  For example, the Canadians in robotics and the Russians 
in long-duration spaceflight. 
D. DISADVANTAGES 
The main overarching problem with the cooperation on the ISS was that it was not 
an even playing field for all involved.  The U.S. had a dominant role in the program and 
therefore the other partners had to be dependent on the U.S.  This is evident in the 
decision to include Russia as a partner in the space station with little to no consult from 
Europe, Canada and Japan.  With Russia and the U.S. in the senior role, the other 
countries had to settle for a junior position.  Now there is the sole dependence on the 
Russians as far as getting to and from the ISS since the retirement on the U.S. space 
shuttle.  Sole dependence on one country or another is not a goal that countries enter into 
lightly and requires trust on all sides.140 
From the start, there was the fundamental question related to space station 
cooperation of the nature of the partnership.141  The U.S. basic design had itself as the 
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dominant financial and technical contributor.142  The wording of the IGA supported this 
authority: ―the United Sates, acting through NASA, shall also be responsible for overall 
program coordination and direction of the Space Station…[and] shall be responsible for 
overall system engineering and integration…[and] shall also be responsible for overall 
planning for and direction of the day-to-day operation of the manned base….‖143  With 
this basic design, there was concern from both NASA and its international partners about 
maintaining the support that was needed to make this a successful venture, both 
politically and financially.144 
E. LESSONS LEARNED 
The ISS became an international program from the onset because of the scientific, 
technological, and financial challenges of building such a space station could only be 
assured success by pooling resources of other spacefaring nations.145  With such a 
monumental venture, the international cooperation on this program could set the stage for 
all future cooperation in space.  If it were to fail, the consequences would be disastrous 
and more than likely the partners would not be willing to cooperate with the U.S. in 
major scientific projects for a while.146  Due to this, the actors trod the ground lightly and 
many lessons were learned along the way. 
Despite its sometimes uncompromising attitude, the U.S. invitation to work with 
others on the ISS alleviated fears from other countries about the U.S. possibly 
monopolizing space.147  However, the other participants were not as keen with the U.S. 
being a dominant partner.  There was concern of the stability of the program relying on 
one dominant partner being able to deliver what they promised at the risk of failure of the 
whole program.  If the program had troubles, just having international commitment 
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would not be able to sustain it.148  This initial problem could be fixed in the future by 
bringing in equal partners early, with the key word here being equal.149  With the ISS, 
other countries were invited at a much earlier stage of the program than in the past and 
influenced NASA‘s choices and understanding of the options related to their 
participation, but they were still treated as junior partners.150 
Another lesson learned comes from the desire of potential partners for a more 
specific and certain path for the future.  A realistic analysis to sustain the partnership is 
required more than wishful thinking.151  This requires implementing structural 
mechanisms that are acceptable to all, specifically in the areas of a realistic timeline and 
not having to compete with other programs later on.152
,153  As far as timelines, the U.S. 
focus needs to change and be more practical with shorter-term elements, based on a more 
concrete long-term plan.154  This venture was started in 1984 and, today, small 
adjustments are still being made. 
F. CONCLUSION 
International cooperation in the field of human space exploration was not a new 
concept with the ISS.  The 1958 Space Act had the U.S. civilian space program, NASA, 
include international cooperation as its inception.155  However, with the ISS as the largest 
technical cooperation program yet, this was going to be more like a marathon then a 
sprint.156 
As with all major undertakings, whether cooperative in nature or not, there are 
advantages, disadvantages, and lessons learned.  This major space undertaking was being 
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used as a tool of U.S. policy and was not an easy task at that with the objective of a 
stable, congruent space station partnership.157  The ability shown to modify the ISS 
partnership in order to put it on a stable and sustainable path to success was a critical test 
to pass in order to proceed ahead.158  However, the addition of the Russians to the ISS 
partnership was a decision made by the U.S. unilaterally. 
Roger D. Launius of the National Air and Space Museum writes about U.S. 
cooperation in space activities: ―if one were to characterize it accurately throughout the 
last fifty-plus years, the undeniable conclusion is that all parties have enjoyed an uneasy 
relationship in which they have recognized that they were better off cooperating rather 
than competing and in which they constantly jockeyed, even while cooperating, for a 
superior position.‖159  So what are the next steps in the human space exploration and 
what are the capabilities of other spacefaring countries? 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The reasons why countries embark on a human space program fall mainly into 
three categories: political, technological, and economic benefits.  According to David 
Mindell, Scott Uebelhart, Asif Siddiqi, and Slava Gerovitch, ―Human spaceflight 
translates into a symbol of technological advantage, which brings real economic 
dividends, and those, in turn, translate into greater political influence.‖160  However, 
Handberg and Li state that ―up to this point in history, human spaceflight has not been 
militarily or economically relevant…The true political value of space does not come from 
the successful launch of humans but from the political and other implications drawn from 
that act.‖161  Handberg and Li continue that ―political considerations must significantly 
outweigh the economic and scientific benefits.‖162  There is also the prestige that is 
associated with the feat. 
Russia, China, Europe (as part of ESA), Japan and India have embarked on 
various feats of human spaceflight, in part for the above reasons.  In order to rationalize 
whether competition or cooperation is the best way forward for human exploration of 
space, an analysis of these countries‘ human spaceflight experience, capabilities, and 
future plans is provided in this chapter.  Their programs are summarized below with 
respect to human spaceflight as well as areas that could potentially be used for such 
activities in the future. 
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B. CAPABILITIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES 
1. Russia 
With many firsts in human spaceflight—including the first man in space, the first 
woman in space, the first extravehicular activity (EVA), and the first space station—the 
Russians are a definitive force in this field.163‘164  Due to this long legacy, the Russians 
have a vast amount of human spaceflight experience. 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience 
Early Soviet human spaceflight during the 1960s and their experience with 
the ISS are not described here as they were previously described in chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
With the U.S. success in their Apollo program, the Soviets started looking 
into options for an appropriate response.  A piloted mission to Mars, an extended mission 
on the moon and an Earth orbiting space station were the three options the Soviets came 
up with in 1969.  According to Asif Siddiqi, ―the space station program seems to have 
offered the quickest return."165  April 19, 1971, marked the beginning of the 
Soviet/Russia‘s space station era.  Seven different space stations, falling into three 
different generations, marked the next 30 years of their human spaceflight experience. 
The first generation of working space stations was called Salyut.  The first 
five Salyuts are categorized into two types.  The Long-Duration Orbital Station (DOS) 
was equipped with systems and electronics from Soyuz.  DOS was considered the 
―civilian‖ version, as it was operated by a civilian crew at a higher altitude.  Salyut 1 and 
4 fell into this category.  Salyut 1 became the first occupied space station in June 1971 for 
24 days by the crew of Soyuz 11.166  Unfortunately, the crew died upon reentry due to 
depressurization of their capsule.  At the time, the three-person crew was not wearing 
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spacesuits.  As a result of this accident, only two cosmonauts wearing spacesuits would 
be launched in this model of Soyuz.167  Salyut 4 was launched Dec 26, 1974.  Two 
different crews would occupy this station for a total of 93 days.168  According to Asif 
Siddiqi, ―officials decided that the goal of each mission would be to dock with the station 
and ‗revive‘ its systems, any decision on duration would be made during a particular 
flight.‖169 
Salyut 2, 3 and 5 fall into the ―military‖ version of this first-generation 
space station.  They had a lower orbit and an all-military crew.  This version was called 
the Orbital Piloted Station (OPS) Almaz.170  The Almaz was actually the Russians‘ first 
attempt at a space station, but it fell behind schedule.  The DOS version was a 
combination of the Almaz hull and the equipment from Soyuz.  This combination allowed 
the DOS version, Salyut 1, to achieve operation three years before an Almaz version.171  
Salyut 2 broke apart and was therefore never occupied.  Salyut 3 reached orbit in June 
1974 with only one successful crew docking.172  Salyut 5 had two successful crews 
occupy it for 64 days. 
The DOS version of Salyut became the example for all future Soviet space 
station designs.  Salyut 6 and 7 used an improved version of DOS and are considered 
second-generation space stations.  The improvements could sustain life for six months 
instead of the previous one month.173  Other improvements included two docking ports 
instead of one.  Salyut 6 was launched on September 29, 1977.  The first in flight fuel 
transfer occurred with Salyut 6 from an automated expendable cargo spacecraft called 
Progress in 1978.174  Salyut 6 was in orbit for 4.5 years with 16 different crews, which 
included guest cosmonauts from Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Vietnam, Cuba, 
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Mongolia, and Romania.175  It was occupied about half of the time it was in orbit, with 
the longest duration being 185 days.  Salyut 6 became a modular space station in June 
1981.  Cosmos 1267, a module with life support equipment, docked with Salyut 6 until 
they were both deorbited on July 29, 1982.176 
Salyut 7 was launched April 19, 1982, and hosted 10 crews until 1986.  
The crews had cosmonauts from France, India, and the second Soviet female 
cosmonaut.177  The longest duration was 237 days.  Salyut 7 had an improved navigation 
system and two docked modules, Cosmos 1443 and 1686.178  According to Asif Siddiqi, 
Engineers perfected the very first refueling operations in space, mastered 
the logistics of having two ships dock to the same station, directed 
complex repair spacewalks outside the station, managed real-time 
solutions to contingencies in space, and accumulated a wealth of ground-
breaking information on the effects of microgravity on the human 
organism.179 
All the knowledge garnered from Salyut was applied to the third-
generation Soviet space station.  It was launched on February 20, 1986, and was called 
Mir (peace or world in Russian).  Mir became the first permanent residence in space 
being continuously occupied from 1986 to August 1999.  This new system had six 
docking ports and a Salyut 5B digital flight control computer.  Although, when it was 
originally launched, the digital computer was not ready, so the old analogue system was 
used.  Additionally, it was overweight when launched and had to be put in a 51.6 degree 
inclination instead of the desired 65 degrees, which would have allowed for more 
coverage over Russia.180 
The final Mir configuration contained the original core plus five modules 
in a ―T‖ shape.  The modules were for scientific equipment and private sleeping quarters, 
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something the cosmonauts requested after time on Salyut.  Kvant-1 was the first module 
added and was an astronomical observatory.  In the winter of 1989, Kvant-2 was added as 
the air lock module.  Kristall was added in June 1990 as a materials processing research 
module and docking port for the U.S. shuttle.181  Spektr and Priroda were the other two 
modules, sent up in 1995 and 1996.182  In early 1990, a self-contained backpack started 
to be used during EVAs.  This allowed the cosmonauts to no longer have to be attached 
by an umbilical.183  During its 15 years in orbit, Mir was visited by over 100 cosmonauts 
and astronauts until it re-entered the atmosphere on March 23, 2001.184  Asif Siddiqi 
described the de-orbit of Mir as: ―That singular event will probably mean the end of an 
independent Russian piloted space program - the end of the journey that Yuriy 
Alekseyevich Gagarin began in 1961.  It will be the beginning of a new and perhaps more 
exciting voyage.‖185 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles 
Beginning in 1960, the now-named Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training 
Center (GCTC) at Star City has trained not only Russian cosmonauts,186 but also over 90 
international crew members, from over 30 different countries.187  The center has Soyuz 
and Mir simulators, buoyancy lab for EVAs to simulate micro-gravity, centrifuges for G-
loads and survival training.188  Russian-language study is also offered, as well as New 
England-style houses for the NASA astronauts.189 
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Once training is complete, cosmonauts and astronauts are launched into 
space at Baikonur Cosmodromes.  Baikonur Cosmodrome was built in the 1950s and is 
located at Tyuratam junction, 186 miles away from Baikonur in a remote, sparsely 
populated region.190  Because of its location, it is also referred to as Tyuratam 
Cosmodrome.191  Since Gagarin‘s first flight from Pad 1, Baikonur has been the major 
site for piloted launches.192
,193  It supports a variety of launch vehicles to include: Proton-
K, Rokot, Soyuz-U, Molniya-M, Tsyklon-2 and Zenit.  Tyuratam is located in Kazakhstan, 
which became in an independent state in 1991.  Therefore, the Russians are renting this 
cosmodrome at $115 million a year.  There have been some problems in the past with this 
relationship.  For example, Kazakhstan banned launches for a few months in 1999 due to 
two Proton rocket launch accidents.194  More recently, there have been five major Proton 
failures since December 2010, with the most recent occurring on July 1, 2013.  
Kazakhstan has concerns about the effects of the toxic fuels on the local environment and 
population.  The most recent rocket crash carried 600 tons of highly toxic heptyl, amyl 
and kerosene fuel.  Supposedly, the poisonous smoke given off from the burning fuel was 
partially contained by rain at the site.  However, people in the town of Baikonur were told 
to stay inside with the windows closed.195  Because of this, the Russians have announced 
plans for a launch facility in the Russian Far East, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
The Soyuz has been the bedrock of the Russian launch fleet from the early 
1960s until present.  With the Soyuz 1 disaster of a failed main parachute deployment 
resulting in the death of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov, another manned flight was not 
tried until 18 months later in October 1968.  Soyuz 4 and 5 demonstrated rendezvous and 
docking of two manned flights launched a day after each other.  There have been a 
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variety of models and upgrades made to Soyuz.  The Soyuz T model was introduced in 
1980, while the Soyuz TM model was in 1986.  The Soyuz TMA model removed the 
height limitation to act as a lifeboat for the ISS.  More than 100 cosmonauts have flown 
on Soyuz rockets.196 
c. Future Plans 
Russia‘s near future plans include the continued use of the Soyuz.  Right 
now, the Soyuz is the only launch vehicle able to transport crews to and from the ISS.  
The U.S. agreed to pay $424 million for six seats to ferry NASA astronauts to and from 
the ISS through 2016 with return and rescue services until June 2017.197 
The ambitions future plans for Russia in human spaceflight are 
documented in the ―Federal Space Program of Russia for the period from 2006 to 2015,‖ 
the ―Concept of Russian Human Space Flight Development till 2020‖ and ―Guidelines 
for the Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of Space-Related Activities until 
2020 and beyond.‖198,199  These documents outline two main objectives: to explore and 
utilize the near Earth space as well as to study and explore the moon, Mars, and deep 
space.  The purpose of these two objectives are to ―resolve global problems on the Earth 
and in space and to generate new knowledge for the benefit of the humankind.‖200 
To meet these objectives, the Russian Federal Space Agency, or 
Roscosmos, has laid out steps to accomplish them.  The first step is to complete the 
Russian Segment of the ISS by 2015 and then use this full configuration until termination 
by 2020.201  The plan is to complete the addition of six modules resulting in a 
configuration that can act autonomously from the rest of the ISS.  The six modules 
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include: the Mini Research Module 1 and 2, the Multipurpose Laboratory Module 
(MLM), the Node Module, and the Research-and-Power Module 1 and 2.202  The ISS is 
starting to be prepared for the arrival of the MLM expected the end of this year on a 
Proton launch.  EVAs in June and July 2013 have installed external clamps and extended 
cables for power and Ethernet to the designated berthing port.203 
The second step involves the creation of a new crew transportation 
system.204  Roscosmos is working with the ESA on this new spacecraft they have called 
the Advanced Crew Transportation System (ACTS).  The draft agreement has Russia 
building the capsule while ESA constructs the service module and spacecraft engines.  
The purpose of this new vehicle is for Earth orbit in addition to lunar landings.  As of 
2009, the cooperation on ACTS has stopped.  ESA and Russia are now pursing their own 
variants based on ACTs.  However, these two agencies are working on biomedical 
studies for missions to Mars.  The first study was conducted in July 2009 when two 
Europeans and four Russians completed the simulation of a 105-day mission at the 
Institute for Biomedical Problems in Moscow.205 
The next step will be to start constructing the orbital assembly 
experimental piloted space complex before the termination of the use of the ISS,206 
between the years of 2021–2026.207  The last step of the plan will be the development of 
all the necessary tools, equipment and biomedical support to actually accomplish the 
missions to the moon and Mars.208  They have projected to have a human landing on the 
moon by 2025.  However, their official policy statements say within the next 20 years.209  
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One of the stated intentions, once they have set foot on the moon, is to mine for 
Helium-3.210 
After landing on the moon, lunar base construction is projected to begin 
around 2027 to 2032.211  Since the late 1980s, Russia has made references to a lunar 
base.212  The new space vision of Russia focuses heavily on the moon with mention of 
potentially building a space station around it.213  This puts human spaceflights to Mars as 
a goal for approximately 2036 to 2040.214  Russia made mention of sending humans to 
Mars as early as 1978.  Insight into the areas of logistical support, closed cycle life 
support systems, space nuclear power and propulsion is expected to be gained from all 
their space station experience.215 
Projects currently underway include the construction of a new 
cosmodrome on Russian soil, Vostochny (or Svobodniy) and a new six-person vehicle 
launched atop a new rocket called Angara.  A decree was signed in November 2007 to 
build a new launch center.  In July 2008, the system design was approved for 
Vostochny.216  Construction began in 2011 on this $20 billion project with a schedule to 
have it operational by 2018.217
,218  There are also discussions of establishing a Proton 
launch site in Papua, New Guinea.  The Angara rocket is projected to be ready by 2020 
with an Advanced Crew Vehicle (ACV).219 
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The federal government pays for less than two-thirds of the Russian 
Federal Space Program.  This has led to delays in the past.220  Whether or not this will 
lead to delays in their current plan may depend on space tourism and further international 
collaboration. 
2. China 
On October 15, 2003, China became the third country to put a man into space.  
Similarly motivated as the previous two countries, the core reasons for this feat were 
international prestige and security by demonstration of military strength.221  As Joan 
Johnson-Freese stated, ―Manned spaceflight is clearly the ultimate prize in the prestige 
race for which space has long been a tool.‖222  Initially, political considerations 
dominated this military declaration of an even more robust technological capability.  A 
more negative image of ―look what we can do, don‘t mess with us‖ at the onset has 
changed into a more positive, implicit show of force such as ―look at our rising power 
and influence.‖223 
Other benefits include the continuous upgrading of technological capabilities 
needed to accomplish human spaceflight.  According to Johnson-Freese, the ―US Apollo 
program provided a prototype for China in pursuing economic and technical growth.‖224  
In China‘s 2006 White Paper, ―China considers the development of its space industry as a 
strategic way to enhance its economic, scientific, technological and national defense 
strength.‖225  Using their space program to upgrade their technical sectors allows China 
to compete on the world market. 
                                                 
220 Mindell et al., The Future of Human, 21–26. 
221 Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy, 127. 
222 Joan Johnson-Freese, The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze (Malabar, FL: 
Krieger Publishing, 1998), 98. 
223 Handberg and Li, Chinese Space Policy, 134. 
224 Ibid., 133. 
225 2006 Chinese White Paper, as quoted in James Clay Moltz, Asia's Space Race: National 
Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 
99. 
 51 
China strived to accomplish manned spaceflight independently.  In the 1980s, 
both the U.S. and Russia offered to fly a Chinese person into space.  The U.S. had to 
cancel its invitation due to the Challenger accident and nothing came of the Russian 
invitation.226  According to Brian Harvey, China wanted the ―longer, tougher and more 
demanding task of becoming the third country to put up its own cosmonauts through its 
own efforts.‖227 
Like the early USSR space program, secrecy surrounds the Chinese program.  
Johnson-Freese entitled one of her books The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within 
a Maze and notes that ―the status of the entire manned program is currently one of the 
more ambiguous areas of Chinese intent.‖228  Below is a snapshot of what is known of 
this ambiguous area. 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience 
Unlike the programs involved in the 1960s space race, the Chinese space 
program moved cautiously and deliberately with human spaceflight.  They perceived that 
any failure would be public and damaging to their position in the world, especially failure 
early on which would have ―deleterious effects upon the prestige sought by such 
activities.‖229  As Harvey describes, ―They have set about the project in their typical 
manner: thorough long-term background preparation, the acquisition of experience from 
other countries, the training of trainers, and the eventual designation of a project code.  
When they are ready, they will fly.‖230  Johnson-Freese makes a ―tortoise and hare‖ 
comparison between the Chinese and U.S. paths to putting a man in space: ―What China 
has that the United States lacks—and what may give the Chinese an advantage over the 
long run—is patience.‖231 
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The Chinese space program can be broken down into ten-year periods 
with attempts at two distinct human spaceflight programs, one which failed in the 
Cultural Revolution and the other is ongoing.232 
In the first ten years, 1956 to 1966, the program was first established.  
Unfortunately, it was plagued by two events: the Great Leap forward and the withdrawal 
of Soviet support.233  Mao Zedong, in January 1956, declared development of science 
and technology as a national priority.  During the 1960s, China broadcast intentions of 
human spaceflight but missile development and nuclear technology were much higher 
priorities.  However, in 1965, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) was tasked to 
develop a long-term space program.  The Ten-Year Plan, produced in March 1966, 
involved three steps to orbit a satellite, recover a satellite, and conduct a manned 
spacecraft.234 
The years 1966 to 1976 also represent the period marked by the Cultural 
Revolution.235  During this time frame, the first attempt at a human spaceflight program 
was started under Project 714.  On April 1, 1968, the Space Medicine Project Research 
Institute was stood up to be responsible for training taikonauts, Chinese astronauts, and 
doing research on manned spaceflight.  Project 714 was established July 14, 1970, just a 
couple months after their first orbiting satellite.236  By March 1971,237 the first round of 
88 fighter pilots had been whittled down to 19 taikonaut candidates, although they were 
not informed what they were selected for.  They would be trained by the Air Force‘s 
Astronauts Training Committee formed on May 15, 1971.  It was predicted that training 
would start in November 1971 for the first crewed launch aboard the Shuguang-1, 
meaning dawn, atop a Dong Feng 5 missile scheduled in 1973.238 
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But the plan was changed abruptly on September 13, 1971, when Lin Biao 
died mysteriously in a plane crash.  His death came after a conflict with Mao about what 
he saw as his rightful place as the head of state.  Due to close ties with Lin, the 
Astronauts Training Committee was dissolved in mid-November and Project 714 was 
completely shut down on May 13, 1972.  However, the Space Medicine Project Research 
Institute continued after the original manned program was cancelled.239 
During the third period, from 1976 to 1986, manned spaceflight was put 
on the back burner as the country was recovering from the Cultural Revolution and 
beginning to turn its focus to national economic development.240  In 1978, Deng 
Xiaoping said ―as far as space technology is concerned, we are not taking part in the 
space race.  There is no need for us to go to the moon and we should concentrate our 
resources on urgently needed and functional practical satellites.‖241 
From 1986 to present, the Chinese have entered their ―heyday‖ with space 
as a ―cornerstone of the national science and technology development effort.‖242  In 
1987, a space committee meeting suggested specific plans for human spaceflight for the 
early 21st century.243  President Jiang Zemin was searching for national prestige, similar 
to the U.S. in the 1960s. 
The second and current human spaceflight program was originally created 
as part of Project 863, the nation‘s major technological development program.  Project 
863-2 was for aerospace technology with 863-204 representing development of a launch 
vehicle and manned spacecraft.244  By 1991, the Chinese had decided to go with a three-
module manned spacecraft arrangement similar to Soyuz with an orbital module capable 
of operating independently for 180 days.245 
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On September 21, 1992, Project 921 became the road map for China‘s 
human spaceflight program.246  The initial timeline consisted of the first unmanned 
spacecraft test launch in 1998, at the earliest.  Three successful test flights were called for 
before the first crewed launch.  The first manned launch would be by 2002 with an 
orbiting space lab by 2007.  The final step would be a permanent space station after 
2010.247  The China National Space Administration (CNSA) was created in 1993 to put a 
civilian facade on the space program; however, most functions still remained in the 
defense industry.248 
With a rekindled alliance, on March 25, 1994 a treaty was made with 
Russia.  For a price, the Russians provided an engine, rendezvous system, docking 
module, Soyuz capsule minus equipment, space suit, and personnel training.  Two 
taikonauts stayed at Star City for spaceflight training in order that they could come back 
and instruct the other taikonauts.249  According to Tai Ming Cheung, this exchange 
resulted in ―shortening the development cycle of the program and allowing the Chinese to 
make a generational skip.‖250  While this equipment and training were helpful and 
accelerated the process, the Chinese believe that it probably would not have stopped their 
progression if it was not obtained.251 
Project 921 was publicly announced in 1996.  The Chinese still maintained 
control over all information that was reported to ensure that only a positive light was shed 
on the program.252  Twelve new taikonauts were selected from the Air Force fighter pilot 
core.253  Unlike the U.S. Mercury astronauts, the taikonauts‘ identities were not initially 
announced.254 
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Yang Liwei was identified as a taikonaut only on October 15, 2003, when 
he became the first to be launched into space aboard Shenzhou 5.  He completed 14 orbits 
in 21 hours where he just sat in his spacecraft to minimize the chance of something going 
wrong.  China was now the third nation to put a man into space and return him safely to 
Earth.255 
Unlike the other two countries that had raced earlier and quickly sought to 
get additional astronauts/cosmonauts into orbit, China‘s second manned launch was not 
for another two years.  On October 12, 2005, taikonauts Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng 
were launched into orbit aboard Shenzhou 6.  They moved about the capsule and 
conducted experiments on their five-day mission.  The next crewed mission, Shenzhou 7, 
was projected to coincide with the 2008 Beijing Olympics.256  But it was launched after 
the Olympics in October 2008 with three taikonauts aboard.257  China entered the second 
phase on Project 921 during Shenzhou 7‘s flight when a 14-minute EVA was conducted 
and included the waving of the Chinese flag.258  The second phase called for advanced 
orbital operations to include EVA, rendezvous and docking, and a habitable space 
module.259 
The habitable space module, Tiangong 1, was launched September 29, 
2011, aboard a Long March 2F from Jiuquan.260  A few weeks later, Shenzhou 8 was 
launched, unmanned.  Its mission consisted of two automatic docking maneuvers.261  
Shenzhou 9, launched June 16, 2012, had a crew of two men and China‘s first female 
taikonaut.  Like her male counterparts, she was also a military pilot, but on transport 
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planes.262.  The crew of Shenzhou 9 achieved the first Chinese manned space docking.263  
Unlike previous missions where the spacecraft was controlled from the ground, the crew 
of Shenzhou 9 was given responsibility for controlling their spacecraft.  They spent 10 
days of their 13-day mission in Tiangong 1.264 
The most recent feat for the Chinese human space program came on June 
10, 2013.  Shenzhou 10 launched with a three-person crew to include a second female 
taikonaut, Wang Yaping.  Again, the launch was atop a Long March 2F launched from 
Jiuquan.  During their time in orbit, Wang Yaping gave a lecture to Chinese school 
children from Tiangong-1.265  After 15 days in orbit, 12 of which they spent on 
Tiangong-1, they returned safely on June 26. 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles 
As with the rest of the Chinese space program, little is publicly known 
about their facilities.  Unconfirmed reports in 1988 described a manned space training 
facility in the western suburbs of Beijing with the largest centrifuge in the world.  In the 
summer of 1992, there were rumors of a manned spaceflight center near Jiuquan.266  
What is known is that the Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center with testing 
facilities was built in 1993.267  Also, four Yuan Wang 4 tracking ships are used as 
tracking stations.268  Because of these tracking ships, typical launches are during the 
northern hemisphere autumn and winter due to calmer seas.269 
There are four launch sites for China: Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang, and 
Haikou.  Jiuquan is the busiest of the four and the only one thus far where manned 
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launches have occurred.  At the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, there is a vehicle 
assembly building, transporter, and tower for servicing on the pad.270  Construction 
began in April 1958 in the Gobi desert of Northern China.  The vehicles launched from 
here include the Long March 1, 2 and Feng-Bao.271 
The newest site, Haikou, was originally used as a minor launch site for 
sounding rockets.  The original construction began in 1986.272  Located on Hainan Island 
off the southern coast of China, the site can be used for low-latitude, low altitude 
launches over water.273  Also, due to its location, larger payloads can be launched 
because of delivery by ship.  By 2014, a launch is planned for the larger Long March 5, 
which will ultimately be used to put the Chinese space station into orbit.274 
On the first attempt at a manned program in the late 1960s, Shuguang-1 
was the planned capsule.  It was designed with two modules, a reentry capsule capable of 
carrying two people and an equipment module.  The landing would have been a hard 
ballistic landing where the taikonauts would experience up to 10G‘s during reentry.275  
Although parachutes were planned for the capsule, it was believed that the taikonauts 
would use their ejection seats in order to bail out before landing.  Another speculated 
option for the landing was using a splashdown similar to the U.S. Gemini program, which 
Shuguang-1 was based on.276  The rocket projected to be used was the Long March 2, but 
with significant booster upgrades.277 
The second and current design capsule is a descendant of Soyuz called 
Shenzhou.  It is made up of three components: an orbital module, reentry capsule, and 
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service module.278  The orbital module will remain in orbit for up to 200 days and has a 
hatch where the taikonauts can conduct EVAs.279  An estimated $2.1 billion, from 1992 
to 2003, was spent on this design with half of the money being spent on facilities.280  
Shenzhou is built by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and 
is currently launched from Jiuquan.281 
On November 20, 1999, the Shenzhou 1 prototype was launched on the 
Long March 2F.  It made 14 orbits with an acceptable landing on November 21.  Since 
the Chinese were not under external ―space race‖ pressure, they sought to get it right, 
thus avoiding failure and embarrassment, rather than accomplish the feat quickly.  
Therefore, Shenzhou 2 didn‘t fly until January 19, 2001.  Also an unmanned test, 
Shenzhou 2 was considered the first of three needed test flights before a manned mission.  
It made 108 orbits in seven days282 with a monkey, dog, rabbit, and snails on board.  It 
also maneuvered in orbit three times.283  Although unmanned, the launch was not wasted, 
as it also carried 64 experiments.  There were assumed problems with the reentry module 
because China did not release photos.284  However, the Chinese said that the various 
animals, plants and seeds that were carried on board were recovered intact.285  The orbital 
module stayed up until August 21, 2001.286 
Shenzhou 3 was launched March 25, 2002, and was considered the first 
crew-rated spacecraft although still unmanned.  Forty-four experiments along with a 
dummy crew member aboard Shenzhou 3 made 107 orbits in seven days.287  The final 
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dress rehearsal was with Shenzhou 4, launched December 30, 2002.288  The 12 taikonaut 
candidates were there to witness the launch.  After seven days and 108 orbits, the reentry 
capsule returned on January 5.289  The next launch, Shenzhou 5, would have a man on 
board. 
Tiangong is China‘s space laboratory.  It consists of a larger 
experiment/habitat module and a smaller support module.  The habitat module consists of 
work and living quarters with exercise equipment and entertainment system, but no food 
or toilet facilities.  Their Shenzhou capsule is used for that.  The support module consists 
of maneuvering thrusters, attitude control, gas and water supplies, and solar arrays.  The 
design life for Tiangong is two years.290 
For China, their series of launch vehicles started as the Dong Feng 
ballistic missile developed in the 1960s.  The Long March, known as the Chang Zheng or 
CZ series in Chinese, are designed and developed by CASC and its subsidiaries.  The 
Long March 2F is used solely for launches of the Shenzhou craft and the Tiangong space 
laboratory.  Its first flight was November 20, 1999, with Shenzhou 1, and it has had 11 
successful flights to date.  It is a two-stage rocket with four strap-on boosters.  The fuel 
and oxidizer used are unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen 
tetroxide.291 
c. Future Plans 
China currently has the next generations of the Long March under 
development.  The development of the Long March 5 began in 2001 with its first flight 
now planned for 2014.  It will be a heavy-lift rocket launched from Haikou with payloads 
including space station modules.  The Long March 9 is just in the design phase, but is 
planned to be a super-heavy lift rocket capable of launching taikonauts to the surface of 
the moon in 2020–2025.292 
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In the near future, China desires to be included on the ISS.  They have 
repeatedly expressed strong interest in cooperation on the station.  The docking 
mechanism of Shenzhou is based on that of Soyuz making it possible to dock with the ISS.  
In preparation, taikonauts are learning English and Russian.293  The success China has 
had in their human spaceflight program matches their heightened view of deserved 
international status and thus inclusion into the ISS.294 
The current Chinese human spaceflight program is based on a three-step 
process.  Having achieved the first two steps (manned spacecraft followed by a manned 
space station similar to Salyut), China is working on perfecting the process before 
moving onto the next step of a space station similar to the ISS.295  Tiangong is meant to 
be a series of three space laboratories.296  Tiangong-2 is initially scheduled for launch 
later on this year and is expected to be larger with more advanced testing.  Tiangong-3 
will be larger still with two docking ports and a possible launch by 2015.297  Four more 
crews are planned to visit these laboratories.298 
Part three of the current program includes plans for a 30-ton station by 
2022.299  As previously mentioned, the Long March 5 must be completed and tested 
before a station of this size is possible.300  A new round of taikonaut candidates will be 
needed in the next five years to man this new station.  The candidates will include 
scientists from the civilian sector according to Liu Shujun, the selection-committee 
member.301 
After completion of the three-step program, the Chinese aim for the moon 
but not until completion of Chang’e, their robotic lunar exploration program.302  
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According to China‘s 2006 White Paper, ―Having made a historic breakthrough in 
manned spaceflight, China has embarked on a comprehensive lunar exploration 
project.‖303  Although it is known that China plans to put a man on the moon, the 
projected dates range from possibly by 2024304 to 2030 or beyond.305 
Whether China‘s space future involves more cooperative missions with 
the U.S. is unknown.  According to Handberg and Li, ―China by necessity and 
increasingly by choice chooses to be a solo operator… Cooperation for China, however, 
will now come as an equal partner or not at all.‖306  In November 2009, President Obama 
and President Hu Jintao made a joint statement of ―expanding discussions on space 
science cooperation and starting a dialogue on human space flight and space 
exploration.‖  NASA Administrator Charles Bolden visited China in October 2010 to 
discuss possible cooperation in human spaceflight.  A Chinese space scientist, Yi Zhou, 
stated although ―the future is promising… There is no obvious way to jump-start actual 
cooperation in a short period of time.‖307 
3. ESA Countries 
Unlike Russia, China, and the U.S., the European Space Agency does not have an 
independent human spaceflight program.  However, like Japan, ESA does have extensive 
human spaceflight experience obtained by using the U.S. and Russia to access space.308  
Nineteen countries now make up ESA, with France and Germany being the two major 
contributors. 
With the first satellite launches from the Soviets and Americans, Europe was the 
most publicly concerned about their space ―technology gap.‖  ESA has pursed 
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independent spaceflight options in the past, but have been hindered by budget 
uncertainties.309  ESA invests roughly 25% of its overall budget to human spaceflight.310 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience 
The origins of ESA start with the creation of two European organizations: 
the European Launch Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space 
Research Organization (ESRO).  Both of these organizations were created in 1964311 and 
both seemed to lack direction.  The British Trade Minister, Michael Heseltine, became 
the political leader to force the combination of ELDO and ESRO.  He proposed the 
merger in the summer of 1972.312 
In January 1973, an initial agreement was made about merging into a 
single agency.  However, the July 12, 1973 conference to formalize the merger ended 
with disagreement.  The conference was rescheduled for July 31, giving the council time 
to figure out how to get the three major players, France, Germany and Britain, to agree.  
The solution was three founding projects, one each for the major players: a new launcher 
led by France, cooperation with the U.S. on Spacelab led by Germany, and a Maritime 
Orbital Test Satellite led by Britain.313 
Besides the founding projects, ground rules were set for ESA so as not to 
run into the same problems that hindered ELDO and ESRO.  The budget would be set 
each year by the Minister of Science from each member state.  There were two 
mandatory programs that all participants had to support: general administration and the 
science budget.  A major selling factor was that the states had the ability to opt out of all 
other programs.  They could follow national preferences and decide which programs they 
would participate in.  However, the contracts for each program were awarded based on a 
country‘s financial inputs.  Although individual countries would be awarded a contract, 
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each project would be managed by ESA directly or a delegated agency.  This created a 
single management point, a fix to a problem with ELDO.314  Also, conducting military 
space programs was prohibited.  Initially, only civilian activities were authorized.315  
However, this is no longer a tenet. 
ESA was not officially named until early 1975 with the first Director Roy 
Gibson assuming command on April 16, 1975.316  ESA membership currently includes: 
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  Canada, although not a member, has 
special status.317
,318 
The founding program given to Germany was cooperation with the U.S. 
on Spacelab.  In building the space shuttle, NASA exhausted a lot of their budget.  Now 
there was a shuttle with no mission, so the U.S. sought Europe‘s financial help.  Europe 
originally wanted to build a space tug to boost payloads from the shuttle into a higher 
orbit.  Eventually, the negotiations had Europe building a Research and Applications 
Module that they called Spacelab.  The overall outcome fell short of initial 
expectations.319 
On August 14, 1973, the agreement was made between NASA and ESA 
on the Spacelab program.  Europe would build the Spacelab and NASA would launch it.  
They would share the research space for the first mission as well as have at least one 
European astronaut on board.  Afterwards, NASA would buy a completed Spacelab and 
Europe would have to pay for launch services.320 
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To prepare for Spacelab’s first mission, ESA started recruiting their first 
astronauts in 1974.  The ESA astronauts would become payload specialists with generic 
astronaut training, but the majority of their training time would be spent on 
familiarization of the experiments to be flown.  Each ESA country did its own initial 
selection process given common guidelines for candidates.  By the summer of 1977, 12 
countries sent up a total of 53 candidates to ESA for consideration.  After extensive 
medical, psychological, and English proficiency tests, ESA decided on its first four 
astronauts on December 22, 1978.  They were from Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland.  However, for most of the 1980s, Europe mainly relied on nationally 
selected astronauts for missions instead of the initial four selected by ESA.321 
The first European manned flight occurred from November 28 to 
December 8, 1983 aboard STS-9 Columbia with Spacelab 1.  Ulf Merbold, from 
Germany, was the chosen astronaut.322  He also was the first non-American to fly on the 
shuttle.323  During the ten-day mission, 72 experiments were conducted.  In 1985, 
Spacelab 2 and 3 would fly, although Spacelab 3 ended up flying before Spacelab 2.  
Both missions had European experiments, but no European astronauts.324 
Three more European astronauts flew from October 30 to November 6, 
1985 as a part of the Spacelab D mission.  This was a dedicated German mission, which 
flew 75 experiments with two German astronauts and Wubbo Ockels from the 
Netherlands.  Ockels was one of ESA‘s original four.  This shuttle mission was actually 
controlled from the Operation Control Centre in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany.  After the 
Challenger accident, Spacelab was suspended for five years and reduced to 18 more 
missions.  In those remaining 18 missions, Merbold would fly for a second time and five 
other European astronauts would also get a chance.325 
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ESA came out with a long-range plan for space in 1987.  This plan 
included a new launcher, contributions to the U.S. led space station program, and a 
reusable space plane.  Ariane 5, Columbus, and the Hermes space plane could have 
potentially given Europe complete autonomy in space and its own human spaceflight 
program.  Due to financial constraints, particularly from German reunification, by 1993 
Hermes was cut and Columbus was greatly downsized.  However, Ariane 5 remained 
intact.326 
In the summer 1993, an agreement was reached with Russia for two ESA 
missions to Mir, called Euromir missions.  Four ESA astronauts were assigned to these 
missions.  They started their training in Star City in August 1993.  This training included 
Russian language studies, spacecraft familiarization, and mission-specific training.  With 
experience from the Spacelab missions, Merbold was launched on October 4, 1994, along 
with two Russian cosmonauts.  Merbold conducted 20-minute broadcasts daily to the 
ESA facilities in Apris, Cologne and the Netherlands.327 
The second Euromir mission was launched on September 3, 1995 with 
Thomas Reiter as the ESA astronaut.  On October 20, he conducted the first ESA‘s EVA, 
spending five hours out of the spacecraft.  An ESA council meeting was occurring at the 
same time as the EVA, so Reiter made a broadcast to the meeting.  Due to Russian 
delays, Reiter ended up spending 44 extra days in space, which enabled him to conduct a 
second spacewalk.  He returned to Earth on February 29, 1996, after 179 days in 
space.328 
ESA decided to combine their astronauts with the national astronauts on 
March 26, 1998.  This would enable all European astronauts to have the same training 
and be based out of the European Astronaut Training Centre in Cologne.  The plan was to 
get 16 astronauts by 2000 and then hold selections for new astronauts every two years to 
replace those who left the program.329 
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As for experience on the ISS, Reiter became the first European to do a 
complete six month visit to the ISS in 2006.330  Frank De Winne of Belgium became the 
first European to command the ISS as part of Expedition 21331 during his stay on the ISS 
from May 27 to December 1, 2009.332 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles 
The EAC was created in 1990 in Cologne, Germany.333  EAC is currently 
the home to ESA‘s 14 astronauts.  It is organized into four sections: the Astronaut 
Department, the Astronaut Training Division, the Medical Crew Support Office, and the 
Management and Support Office.334  As a part of the facilities, there are a number of 
spacecraft mock-ups and simulators to include the Spacelab simulation facility.335  Also 
on the grounds is the largest water tank in Europe for training in EVAs.  In addition, to 
aid in simulating weightlessness, the French Airbus 300 aircraft is used.336  The ―basic 
training‖ at the EAC consists of 16 months broken into four training blocks: introduction, 
fundamentals, space systems and operations, special skills to include learning Russian 
and spacewalk training in the Neutral Buoyancy Facility, water tank.337 
Germany also has four major control centers.  The European Space 
Operations Centre (ESOC) in Darmstadt338, Germany, was created in 1967 and has been 
mission control for over 60 satellites.339  The Operation Control Centre in 
Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany controlled Spacelab D.340  It is now called the German 
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Space Operations Centre and controls the Interconnection Ground Subnetwork used by 
the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) Control Centre (ATV-CC).341  The ATV-CC is 
based out of the Toulouse space center and is ―responsible for carrying out the 
programmed mission plans and, if needed, to implement any changes.  Additionally the 
Centre is in charge of the orbitography, the localization of ATV and monitoring its 
approach to the International Space Station.‖342  The Columbus Control Center is also 
based in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany.  As defined on the ESA website, ―The Control 
Centre is the direct link to Columbus in orbit.  The centre‘s main functions are to 
command and control the Columbus laboratory systems, to coordinate operations of the 
European payloads on board the ISS and to operate the European ground communications 
network.‖343 
While Germany has a majority of the facilities, France provides the launch 
site.  Centre National d‘Etudes Spatiales (CNES) is the French space agency.  CNES 
chose Kourou, French Guiana, as their spaceport in 1964.  It is located on the northern 
coast of South America and averages 15 launches per year.  In 1975, France offered to 
share its launch center with ESA.344  Since then, ESA has funded two-thirds of the 
spaceport‘s annual budget.345  The site is ideal for geostationary launches as it is just 300 
miles north of the equator.346  Also due to its geographical position, it offers a launch 
angle of 102 degrees, which gives it a wide range of potential missions.347 
As France is a ―strong driving force behind initiatives and proposals of 
programs led by the ESA,‖ it is also responsible for the European launcher.348  The 
Ariane rocket series is considered quite reliable despite several failures.349  In July 1973, 
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ESA made the decision to begin development.  An Ariane rocket was first launched on 
December 24, 1979.  By 1984, the more powerful Ariane 2 and then Ariane 3 were 
produced.350  Since then, Ariane 1, 2 and 3 have been phased out.351  June 15, 1988, 
marked the first launch of the Ariane 4, which would become the ―workhorse‖ for ESA.  
The Ariane 4 can place 1,700–4,800 kilogram payload into geostationary orbit.  There are 
six different versions of the Ariane 4.  The Ariane 5 had its first successful launch on 
October 30, 1997.  Future upgrades plan to improve the performance of the Ariane 5 and 
make it more versatile.352 
The contract for Spacelab was given to FW-Fokker Erno, a Germany 
company since Germany footed a majority of the bill.  However, program management 
was given to the European Space Technology Centre in the Netherlands.  Spacelab had 
three separate configurations.  In one configuration, a full laboratory took up all the 
available space.  Another configuration was filled with pallets only.  The final 
configuration was a combination of the other two with a smaller lab and some pallets.353 
Hermes was ESA‘s attempt at a space plane program.  CNES originally 
announced the idea of a space plane in October 1978, but was not officially committed 
until 1981.  Original plans for Hermes had it launched atop the Ariane 5 and capable of 
carrying five crew members.  The idea for a space plane was a potential outcome from 
the frustrations felt due to the minimal use of Spacelab by European astronauts.  France 
pushed for it to become an European project.  Nonetheless, in January 1985, ESA chose 
to stick with Ariane 5 and Columbus, their contribution to the ISS, instead.  ESA wanted 
to take small steps toward manned flight and the American shuttle would do for now.  
France still pressed forward hoping other countries would join on and that they would be 
successful because it was a ―small‖ space plane compared to the shuttle or Soviet 
Buran.354 
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Finally in October 1985, ESA adopted the Hermes project.355  
Unfortunately, there were multiple design changes.  Hermes kept getting larger and the 
bigger it got, the more upgrades were needed to the Ariane 5 to provide the thrust.  In 
1990, Hermes was redesigned to be smaller, with only a three-person crew and parts of it 
not being reusable.  The non-reusable parts included the rear part of the spacecraft 
containing the propulsion, docking, and resource modules that would be dropped before 
re-entry.  Hermes started to lose support.  The program started to be stretched out by 
delaying its first launch.  By now, it was 40.5% over budget.  Although, never actually 
terminated, it started to wither away after a ministerial summit in Granada, Spain.356 
At the same meeting that ultimately ended Hermes, the ATV was 
provisionally approved.  It was decided if Europe could not have independent manned 
access to the ISS, at least it should be able to have an unmanned supply vehicle.  The 
ATV program was officially approved in 1995 at an ESA council meeting in Toulouse.357  
The purpose of the ATV is to ferry cargo to the ISS, correct the station‘s orbit, and then 
finish as an incinerator.358  The original plans foresaw the ATV being launched from 
Kourou every 12 months, hauling 7.5 tons of cargo.  It would then dock with the ISS for 
up to 6 months, and then dispose 6.5 tons of waste by burning up in the earth‘s 
atmosphere.  Thus, the ATV can carry supplies three times that of Progress.359  The 
estimated cost was about $400 million per vehicle.360  Four ATVs have successfully 
docked with the ISS since April 3, 2008.  Each ATV carried food, clothes, equipment, 
and oxygen as well as propellant to reboost the ISS‘ orbit.361  Albert Einstein, ATV-4, 
docked with the ISS on June 15, 2013 and is currently still docked.362 
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c. Future Plans 
ESA‘s future plans contain more work and practice with long-duration 
human spaceflight.  Since 2005, it has had a permanently crewed base in the Antarctic 
called Concordia.  ESA uses Concordia to study human interaction for a long-duration 
spaceflight.  Also according to ESA, ―The base is so unlike anything found elsewhere in 
the world that ESA participates in the Italian-French base to research future missions to 
other planets, using the base as a model for extraterrestrial planets.‖363 
The European Robotic Arm (ERA) is Europe‘s next contribution to the 
ISS. ERA is a joint ESA-Russian Federal Space Agency project with the purpose of 
supporting assembly and servicing tasks to include the installation and exchange of 
external equipment.  Dutch Space is leading the ESA portion of the project, which was 
approved in 1994.  ERA is a direct descendant of the Hermes Robotic Arm.  The original 
launch date was supposed to be in November 2007.364  However, it is now projected to 
launch this year from Baikonur aboard a Proton rocket.  It will be attached to different 
locations on the Russian Multipurpose Laboratory Module.365 
ESA is also cooperating with NASA on the Orion space capsule.  ESA is 
working on the development of Orion’s propulsion system.  The first manned flight is 
predicted for 2021.  ESA plans to use the rocket engines and other technology from its 
ATV.  Since ESA needs to meet NASA‘s human spaceflight standards, it will use 
NASA‘s testing facilities.366  The first unmanned test flight of Orion is expected in 2017.  
Dan Dumbacher, deputy associate administrator for exploration systems development at 
NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C., stated: ―It is a testament to the engineering 
progress made to date that we are ready to begin integrating designs of an ESA-built 
service module with Orion.‖367 
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The Advanced Reentry Vehicle (ARV) is ESA‘s newest project for an 
independent human spaceflight vehicle.  It will be integrated with the ATV service 
module.  Its first robotic mission is planned for 2015, with the first manned mission 
scheduled for 2020.  ESA is using experience from their successful Atmospheric Reentry 
Demonstrator in 1998368 and their initial work on the Crew Return Vehicle from 1998 to 
2002.  The ATV’s Integrated Cargo Carrier is replaced with a cargo re-entry capsule for 
the ARV.  It will be launched using the Ariane 5 ES and will land in the Atlantic Ocean 
off the coast of Europe.369 
The Aurora Exploration Program is ESA‘s current roadmap to explore the 
solar system.  It was started in 2001 with the goal ―to create, and then implement, a 
European long-term plan for the robotic and human exploration of the solar system, with 
Mars, the Moon and the asteroids as the most likely targets.‖  The capstone of the Aurora 
Exploration Program is ―a voyage by European astronauts to Mars by 2030, with a return 
to the Moon in the meantime.‖370 
4. Japan 
Although Japan does not currently have its own independent human launch 
program, it is considered an accomplished space power with considerable experience in 
human spaceflight.  Close ties with the U.S. and, more recently, commercial 
arrangements with Russia have enabled Japan to use American space services and 
technology to transport Japanese astronauts and hardware into space and the ISS.  Japan 
opted for an unmanned transfer vehicle for the ISS instead of the higher cost and work 
needed for a human rated spacecraft.371  While Japan has the technology to compete in 
space, it currently lacks the organizational and financial backing needed for an 
independent human spaceflight program.372
,373  According to James Clay Moltz, ―Japan 
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is likely to struggle with the costs necessary to operate a much larger space program - one 
replete with independent human spaceflight capacity….‖374 
Hirotaka Watanabe stated that ―autonomy and international cooperation have 
been central pillars of Japan‘s space policy.‖375  Contradictory in nature, these two pillars 
are what Tokyo decision makers are now faced with: whether to continue with 
cooperation and relying on other countries to put their astronauts in space or to have a 
more active and independent human spaceflight program with the associated costs and 
risks.376 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience 
Early Japanese space experience starts with the creation of the National 
Space Activities Council in 1960.  In 1964, the Institute of Space and Aeronautical 
Science (ISAS) at the University of Tokyo was created.  Hideo Itokawa, who is 
considered the leader of Japan‘s rocket program, was put in charge of ISAS.  However, 
the years from 1966 to 1969 were plagued by failures of four Lambda launches and 
delays with the Mu rocket, which ultimately forced Itokawa to resign from ISAS.377 
The National Space Activities Council was renamed and elevated to the 
Space Activities Commission in 1968.  In 1969, the National Space Development Agency 
(NASDA) was formed and became responsible for ―civil space activities, including 
satellite development, major launcher development, and the operation of launch facilities 
and tracking and control stations.‖378  As Harvey puts it: ―Japan in effect developed two 
different, parallel space programmes, a unique situation.‖379 
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The Diet, in 1969, made a resolution that the space program be exclusively 
for nonmilitary purposes and means.  An agreement was also made with the U.S. not to 
transfer launch technology to third parties.380 
In February 1970, Japan‘s first satellite to orbit the earth, Ohsumi, was 
launched atop the Lambda 4S-5.  Subsequently, the Space Activities Commission 
developed a 15-year plan in 1978 entitled the ―Outline of Japan‘s Space Development 
Policy,‖ which included an independent human spaceflight program concentrating on 
materials processing.  However, in 1984, the plan was revised to link their manned 
activities with what is now the ISS.381 
April 1984 saw the first selection process for Japanese astronauts.  The 
533 applicants were whittled down to three in 1985. The launch of a NASDA selected 
astronaut was delayed after the Challenger disaster.  Russia offered to fly them and their 
experiment to Mir but NASDA chose to stick with U.S.382  Incidentally, Japan‘s first 
astronaut was actually a journalist, Toyohiro Akiyama.  The Tokyo Broadcasting System 
(TBS) paid the Russians $12 million for a flight aboard Mir in December 1990383
,384  
While NASDA was waiting for NASA, Russia moved up their timeline with TBS so the 
first Japanese astronaut would fly on a Soviet rocket.385  As part of his first broadcast in 
orbit, Akiyama echoed the words of Yuri Gagarin ―This is Akiyama! The Earth is 
blue!‖386 
NASDA‘s wait was over in September 1992, when Japan‘s second 
astronaut was sent into space.  Mamouri Mohri was launched aboard the U.S. space 
shuttle STS-47 Endeavor.387  His Spacelab J mission focused on the use of Japanese 
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equipment388 for materials processing research.389  While in orbit, Mohri gave a 
microgravity lesson to Japanese school children.  He flew for a total of seven days, 
returning on September 20.390 
Chiaki Mukai became the third Japanese astronaut aboard STS-65 
Columbia from July 8 to 23, 1994.  She was the first Japanese female to fly and would 
also be the first to fly twice with over 566 hours in space.  From January 11 to 20, 1996, 
Koichi Wakata flew aboard STS-72 Endeavor.391  As part of his mission, he retrieved 
Japan‘s free flier, aptly named the Space Flier Unit.392  Following the mission, the whole 
crew of STS-72 toured Japanese schools, factories and civic associations.  As Harvey 
writes: ―American astronaut Dan Berry recalled many years later how he was taken aback 
by the level of enthusiasm with which they were greeted, with Wakata treated like a rock 
star by teenage girls screaming his name and rushing forward with flowers.‖393 
In May 1996, Soichi Noguchi was selected in the third round of astronaut 
applications.  He would be the first Japanese astronaut to train at both NASA Johnson 
Space Center and the GCTC in Star City.394  The first Japanese EVA was conducted by 
Takao Doi aboard STS-87 Columbia on his flight in November 1997.  He ended up 
conducting two EVAs on this mission.395  Mukai‘s second flight came on October 29 to 
November 7, 1998.  She flew on STS-95 Discovery alongside John Glenn.396 
In October 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi merged ISAS and 
NASDA into the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency in an attempt to reduce 
organizational problems, following the failed launch of two Japanese rockets.397  Two 
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more changes to the Japanese space program came in 2008.  First off, Takeo Kawamura 
stated that, ―I came to realize that there was no organization in control and exercising 
leadership in space development in Japan.‖398  This led to the Kawamura initiative, 
which put emphasis on applications, streamlined administration, and military use of 
space.399  Secondly, a Diet vote removed restrictions on military use of space due to 
security concerns over North Korea‘s nuclear and missile programs.400  According to 
Setsuko Aoki, the 2008 Basic Space Law moved Japan‘s space policy toward ―user-
oriented space applications.‖401 
Takao Doi made his second flight on March 11, 2008 as part of STS-123 
Endeavour.  This mission took the first of the Japanese components to the ISS, the 
Experiment Logistics Module of the Japanese Kibo laboratory.402  Kibo is Japan's first 
manned experiment facility.  The Pressurized Module and robotic arm of Kibo was 
brought to the ISS aboard STS-124 Discovery on May 31, 2008.403  Akihiko Hoshide 
accompanied the component.  In March 2009, Koichi Wakata was brought to the ISS for 
a four-month mission aboard Discovery.404  Thus, he became the first resident ISS crew 
member from Japan.405 
The second Japanese resident on the ISS was Noguchi.  He was launched 
aboard a Soyuz in December 2009.  He spent 161 days aboard the ISS.  In March 2010, 
Naoko Yamazaki flew aboard STS-131 Discovery.  She operated the Remote 
Manipulator System both on the Shuttle and the ISS.  Her arrival to the ISS marked the 
first time that two Japanese astronauts worked together in space.  In February 2011, 
Wakata was assigned as a Flight Engineer of ISS Expedition 38 and the Commander of 
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Expedition 39, making him the first Japanese astronaut that will command the ISS.  
Currently, Japan has 8 active astronauts.406 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles 
NASDA opened the Tsukuba Space Center in June 1972.  It has become 
the Japanese equivalent to Mission Control Houston staffed by 60 personnel working 
eight-hour shifts.407  In 1996, a Space Station Operations Facility was built at the center 
for astronaut training.  It consists of a 10 meter-deep swimming tank for EVA practice, 
an isolation chamber and a high-altitude chamber.408  There is also a full-scale model of 
Kibo for the astronauts to train on.409 
The two Japanese launch sites are Uchinoura and Tanegashima.  
Uchinoura is near.410  Kagoshima on the island of Kyushu in the south of Japan.  It was 
established by ISAS in 1962.  Launches from here are eastward over water.411  
Uchinoura was the first Japanese launch facility, but is now just used for sounding 
rockets with the last satellite launch in September 2006.412  The Mu series rockets were 
launched here.413 
Tanegashima is further south than Kagoshima Island and started as 
NASDA‘s launch site.  It has launched the N-1, N-2, H-I and H-II.414  It has become the 
main launch site, currently launching the H-IIA.415  Both launch sites have government 
agreements with local fisherman.  Originally, they could not launch more than twice a 
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year and only in the summer and winter.416  A new agreement was struck to extend the 
launch window to 180 days, while still preserving the prime fishing period of March to 
mid-June at Tanegashima.417 
The Japanese got their start with the Kappa, Lambda, and Mu-series 
launchers418 developed by ISAS.  All of these rockets were solid propellant.  The 
NASDA rockets started with the N-1,419 Japan‘s first major liquid-fuel rocket based on 
the U.S. Delta.  There were a total of seven launches of the N-1 from September 1975 to 
1982.420
,421  The N-II was a heavier booster with its first flight in 1981.422  It launched 
eight times from 1981 to 1987.423 
The H-I, another U.S.-derived vehicle, had nine successful flights from 
1986 until 1992.  The H-II represented Japan‘s first independently designed rocket.  After 
two major explosions, the first successful launch of the H-II was in 1994.  This launch 
was followed by another flight failure but then four successful flights through 1997.  
Launch failures struck again in February 1998 and November 1999 causing NASDA to 
cancel the series.424 
In 1994, NASDA and Mitsubishi announced plans for a reusable space 
plane, Hope425 (or H-II Orbiting Plane).426  The late 1990s saw a series of revisions to 
reduce cost.  Ultimately, it was decided to have a smaller and unmanned vehicle.427  
According to Harvey, Smid, and Pirard, ―Space development is littered with failed 
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spaceplane projects among all the main space powers and the Japanese were no more 
successful than the others in breaking out of this unforgiving field of research.‖428 
The H-IIA made its first successful flight in August 2001.429  Its relatively 
light weight adds to its high rate of performance.  It weighs only 285 tons compared to 
Ariane 4 at 460 tons and Proton at 1,000 tons.430  The first mission of the alternative 
design to Hope occurred in September 2009.  Named the H-II (or Hope) Transfer Vehicle 
(HTV), it can ferry six tons of cargo to the ISS and burn up trash in the atmosphere upon 
reentry.431  Unlike the Russian Progress and Europe‘s ATV, the HTV supports 
pressurized and unpressurized cargo.432  The current plan for the HTV is for one flight 
per year until 2016.433 
c. Future Plans 
While there is solid public support for an independent Japanese human 
spaceflight program with a purpose of stimulating younger people‘s interest, there are 
still concerns with costs and risks: the death of an astronaut could create negative 
implications.  However, the Japanese have shown their commitment to space.434  Their 
close ties with the U.S. continue with the commitment to lunar and/or Mars exploration.  
The U.S. is currently without a human-rated launch vehicle, which may have motivated 
recent discussion regarding human-rating the HTV.435 
In March 2005, JAXA issued the ―JAXA 2025 Vision.‖  This vision states 
the goal to ―Promote ‗top science‘ in the field of space science while preparing for 
                                                 
428 Harvey, Smid, and Pirard, Emerging Space, 129. 
429 Moltz, Asia's Space, 55. 
430 Burleson, Space Programs, 190. 
431 Moltz, Asia's Space, 57. 
432 Mindell et al., The Future of Human, 46. 
433 Harvey, Smid, and Pirard, Emerging Space, 117. 
434 Moltz, Asia's Space, 62, 68. 
435 Ibid., 69. 
 79 
Japan‘s own human space activities and the utilization of the Moon.‖436  The vision is 
broken down into two 10-year periods, with their independent human spaceflight 
program coming in the second 10 years.  Before entering the second half of the vision, it 
will be reanalyzed and the government will decide whether to continue or reevaluate.  
The current vision has the Japanese human-rated spacecraft being based on the HTV.  The 
vision concludes that: 
As a goal to be achieved in the coming years (next ten years or so), while 
Japan would not yet initiate its own human space program, it should 
promote the fundamental research and development with a view to making 
it possible to initiate its own human space activities.  Japan continues 
human space activities through the ISS program.  And it is necessary to 
start a study of Japan‘s goal and vision for future. 
As for future perspectives for the long-term development (in twenty to 
thirty years), based on the accomplishments of the on-going and planned 
activities, Japan should make necessary preparations for enabling its own 
human space activities that would contribute to various space 
utilization.437 
5. India 
India expresses similar intentions to China in regard to human spaceflight, which 
are more long-term in nature.  India‘s political interests are driven by their regional 
rivalry with China.438  Unlike the three countries that have put a man in space, India‘s 
space launch vehicles started out as civilian rockets, not converted missiles.  Currently 
there is major debate regarding a human spaceflight program.439  According to Moltz, 
The difficulty, as has been the case historically, has been maintaining the 
firm commitment and funding required to see programs through to their 
fruition.  But India‘s dynamic information technology sector, its slowly 
internationalizing educational system, its rising middle class, and its 
increased recognition of its military needs for first-class support 
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technology from space suggest that the past may not be a mirror of the 
future.440 
a. Human Spaceflight Experience 
While India does not have an independent human spaceflight program, its 
space experience is extensive.  Following the launch of Sputnik, the Indian Astronautical 
Society was formed in 1957.  In 1962, the Indian National Committee for Space Research 
was established.441  Vikram Sarabhai, the father of India‘s space program realized India 
could not compete in a space race.  Therefore, he decided India ―must be second to none 
in the application of advanced technologies for the real problems of man and society.‖442  
Thus, the program focused on communications, meteorology, and remote sensing.443  In 
fact, G.B. Pant criticized the U.S. lunar program in 1967, ―Is this a valid enterprise? 
Could not this effort be applied for the teaming, starved, illiterate, ill housed, ill clad, ill 
cared [for] population of the world?‖444 
In 1969, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) was established 
with Sarabhai as chairman.  In 1972, the Space Commission was created to act in a 
supervisory role, while the Department of Space was for administrative purposes.445  
According to Sundara Vadlamudi, ―During India‘s formative phase, its space program 
benefited greatly from foreign assistance, chiefly provided by the United States, the 
USSR, Japan, West Germany, and other countries.‖446 
The Indians took an offer from Russia to train and fly the only Indian 
astronaut on Salyut 7.  In 1981, they started taking applicants.  From the initial 150 
applicants, six were sent to train at Star City.  In the fall of 1983, the original six were 
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narrowed down to two air force pilots.447  Rakesh Sharma was picked for this honor, 
even though he had less flying experience then the other candidate, because he spoke 
Russian better.448 
On April 3, 1984, Rakesh Sharma was launched into space.  He spent a 
week in space on Salyut 7449 along with 43 Indian experiments.450  The U.S. offered 
India a flight aboard Challenger for their satellite and a crew member.  But, even before 
the Challenger accident, India decided to launch its own satellite and eventually 
withdrew from the agreement.451 
After China‘s first launch of a taikonaut, India reexamined its space 
program.  According to Bharath Gopalalswamy, ―India no longer views space as only 
enhancing the living conditions of its citizens but also as a measure of global prestige.‖452  
In the winter of 2003, Indian space experts and officials held a conference to discuss 
manned flight, which started several study groups.  Eighty Indian space engineers were 
brought together on November 7, 2006, to listen to the results of the 2003 study groups.  
They decided that the way forward was to develop a two-person spacecraft launched 
from their Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) mark III.  Using the 
experiences of other countries, India decided that three unmanned launches had to occur 
first, as had been the Chinese plan.  Also for the initial spacecraft design, they looked to 
Russia.453 
For India, the way forward is going to be costly, but the alternative is 
―relegating itself to falling further behind China in a field of technology that is critical to 
national defense and to its economic competitiveness.‖454  In the fall of 2012, an 
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announcement has further postponed the human spaceflight effort to at least 2021.  
According to K. Radhakrishnan, chairman of ISRO: ―As of now, we do not have a 
program to launch a human spaceflight over the next five years.  We are also yet to get 
approval from the government for the manned mission.‖455  Potential reasons for the lack 
of final government approval include the huge cost and two recent failures of GSLV 
launches.  The government had cut the budget allocation for the human spaceflight work 
in their financial year, which just ended in April 2013 by more than a third.  
Radhakrishnan explained ―Though we had successfully conducted a 12-day space capsule 
recovery experiment using a lower-orbit rocket in January 2007, we have to work on a 
full-fledged project on mission mode for the human spaceflight at a revised cost.‖456 
b. Facilities, Launch Sites, and Vehicles 
In 2008, ISRO bought a site near the Bangalore airport for the 
construction of an astronaut training center.457  The original completion date was in 2012, 
but it seems not much progress has actually been made.  Early this year, the founder of 
India‘s first private space company, Susmita Mohanty indicated in an interview that 
ISRO ―is planning to build a residential astronaut training facility.‖458 
India‘s main launch site is the Satish Dhawan Space Center,459 named 
after the second head of ISRO on September 5, 2002.460  It is located on the barrier island 
Sriharikota, located east of Bangalore,461 in the Bay of Bengal.  Bangalore is where ISRO 
is based.462  The GSLV is launched from the Satish Dhawan Space Center.463 
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The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) was the first to have a liquid-
fuel second stage.  Up to this point, all the Indian rockets were solid fuel.464  The first 
successful test flight was on September 20,465 1993.466  Developed at the Vikram 
Sarabhai Space Center,467 the PSLV is currently the main launch vehicle.468  The liquid 
propellant stages for the PSLV were developed at the Liquid Propulsion Systems 
Center.469 
Using existing technology and experience from PSLV,470 the GSLV was 
designed.  A deal was initial struck with the Soviet Union for cryogenic liquid-fuel 
engines and production technology for the upper stage of the GSLV.  The U.S. worried 
this deal could be used for long-range ballistic missiles, which led to pressure on both 
Russia and India, sanctions, and ultimately financial aid to Russia to prevent the sale.  
Instead, the Indians were given completed boosters but no production information.471  
Ironically, hearing that India was in the market for cryogenic engines, American General 
Dynamics Corporation had approached India before the Soviet Union about the engines 
and transfer technology, but India had deemed the U.S. offer too costly.472 
The first flight of the GSLV was on April 18,473 2001, with the Soviet 
boosters.  But the Indians wanted to build their own cryogenic engines.474  The next 
generation GSLV, GSLV mark II, had the Indian upper stage called the Cryogenic Upper 
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Stage.475  However, they are still perfecting their engine technology476 at the Liquid 
Propulsion Systems Center.477 
On August 17, 2002, the new version of GSLV, the mark III, was 
approved.  The GSLV mark III was supposed to carry a manned flight in 2016.  The 
capsule is supposed to be the Space Recovery Experiment (SRE-2).  The SRE-1 atop the 
PSLV was launched on January 10, 2007.  The SRE-1 had a successful re-entry and 
parachute deployment.  In December 2008, a deal was made with Russia to base the 
Indian manned spacecraft on the Soyuz design and to have Russia aid with training of 
Indian astronauts.478  But, as noted above, the first mission now has been postponed to 
after 2020.479 
c. Future Plans 
India has shown a major commitment to human spaceflight, seeming to 
stem from its strong desire not to be out done by China.480  In announcing India‘s human 
spaceflight program in 2006, ISRO chairman G. Madhavan Nair stated that the main 
reason for this change in policy was that a ―human presence in space may become 
essential for planetary exploration.‖481  Other reasons included: independence from the 
other major space actors, use of the moon for energy materials, benefits for industry, 
useful spin-offs, and that India was in need of a new goal.482  But, according to Asif 
Siddiqi, ―From a purely practical perspective, the manned program seems unnecessary to 
ISRO‘s original mandate; it is clear that the manned program is not about the pursuit of 
scientific or technical knowledge or about alleviating poverty—it is first and foremost 
about prestige.‖483 
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In the eleventh ―Five-Year Plan‖ for ISRO covering the years from 2007 
to 2012, it was stated that ―Space has emerged as the next frontier of human endeavor 
and manned missions are the logical next step to space research.‖484  An estimated $2 
billion to $2.45 billion will be needed for the manned program.485
,486   In the 2008–09 
budget, however, only $25 million was given for the developmental phase.487  India will 
need to commit to a major increase in funding for human spaceflight if it is going to meet 
its goal.  According to a space department official, ―Once the project gets the final 
approval, it will take at least six to seven years for the launch.‖488  As Radhakrishnan 
stated, ―Though we have identified critical technologies for such an ambitious project, we 
have to build the capabilities for undertaking such a challenging mission.‖489  This 
pushes the original timeframe to 2020–21 before India‘s first human spaceflight, if the 
project is approved this year. 
An ISRO official stated ―We are currently aiming to have a manned 
spaceflight program.  A manned lunar mission will come much later.‖490  A manned 
moon mission was original discussed for 2020, but that now seems to be a distant 
dream.491  Although, according to a minister in the Indian prime minister‘s office, ―There 
is no immediate plan for a manned mission to the Moon.  The work on the Indo-Russian 
join project, Chandrayann II, is in progress, but Chandrayann II does not envisage [a] 
manned lunar expedition.‖492  Former ISRO chairman, G. Madhavan Nair, has suggested 
that priority should be given to the manned mission initiative rather than to the 
Chandrayann II Mars mission.  Either way, as Jay Menon of Aviation Week & Space 
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Technology put it ―With dwindling funding and no clear road map, India is said to be 
weighing its options for collaborating on human spaceflight….‖493 
C. CONCLUSION 
Besides the United States, Russia and, more recently, China have independent 
human spaceflight capabilities.  Up to this point, Europe and Japan have relied on the 
U.S. and Russia for their spaceflight experience.  While Japan and Europe actively 
pursued human spaceflight from the 1980s through the mid-1990s, the cost-to-benefit 
ratio was inadequate to show the program through.494  Europe and Japan are 
technologically closer to an independent human space program then India, but lack the 
political impetus India has.495  Below is a table summarizing the capabilities of these 
major space powers.  Also below is a figure comparing the past, current, and future 
human space vehicles. 
 
Figure 1.  Overview of space exploration capabilities496 
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Figure 2.  Crewed space vehicles497 
According to Handberg and Li, ―human spaceflight remains the crowning feat for 
all states regardless of its immediate economic and technological usefulness.‖498  This 
has become the high point of space activity due to its extreme technical difficulty, great 
cost, and uniqueness.  Thus far, only three countries have achieved independent human 
spaceflight.499  Handberg and Li conclude that ―the international prestige along with the 
technological cachet associated with human spaceflight justifies the added 
expense…though instrumented flight has prestige value, the attention and interest of the 
world are captured much more by manned flight.‖500 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis sought to answer the question on what the future should hold for the 
U.S. human spaceflight program.  As the Augustine Commission wrote, ―The human 
exploration of space is historically intertwined with the recent evolution of America‘s 
international relationships.‖501  Because of this global dimension, the competition of the 
1960s space race and the cooperation on the ISS were analyzed for lessons for the future.  
According to Launius, ―Mirror image twins international cooperation and competition 
between nation states has driven many of the key decisions in the major programs 
undertaken by the United States, especially in the evolution of its human spaceflight 
initiatives.‖502  In addition, the capabilities of potential partners were researched to see 
how they could enhance a human spaceflight program. 
The biggest lesson learned from the 1960s space race was that it is actually not an 
example to use for future planning.  As Logsdon wrote, after many years of research, 
Apollo should not serve as a model for the many programs for lunar and 
planetary explorations currently making headway: it was a unilateral effort 
whose generous budget would be inconceivable today.  Apollo was a cold 
war political project, driven by President Kennedy‘s judgment that the 
United States had to enter—and win—a space race.  Apollo was conceived 
as a closed-end effort to beat the USSR to the Moon, not as a first step in a 
long-term, sustainable program of space exploration.503 
He goes on to list three reasons why: ―They were not preparing the way for others to live 
and work on the lunar surface…Science was rather clearly a secondary 
motivation…Another way in which Apollo cannot serve as a model for future exploration 
is in terms of its budget profile.504  The International Space Exploration Coordination 
Group (ISECG) agrees that ―The brief sorties by the Apollo astronauts required the 
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ability to sustain humans for only a few days on the lunar surface; there was no attempt to 
establish a long-term presence or exploit local resources.‖505 
In a 1962 article, Laurence C. McHugh accurately describes the lessons that can 
be taken from the 1960s space race: 
How quickly the strange environment of outer space will contribute to 
general human welfare depends in great measure on how free we can keep 
space from outright military use and national territorial claims.  These two 
freedoms, in turn, hinge upon the growth of international cooperation in 
space and the immediate formulation of the rudiments of space law.506 
The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty were two of the 
three greatest lessons learned from the 1960s space race.  McHugh also wrote about the 
third lesson learned, ―But the difficulty of entering space, and its costliness, make it 
likely that the third great space power will not be, for instance, Great Britain…but a 
coalition of nations working with pooled resources.‖507 
Therefore, the next case study was the ISS.  The two advantages of this 
cooperative project for the U.S. were creating a positive image and strengthening the 
perception of openness to outside nations.  The lessons learned in this venture include the 
need to bring in equal partners at the onset and have a more specific and certain path for 
the future.  To ensure the success of this project, which could be the basis for all future 
cooperation, in President Bush‘s speech in January 2004 he stated ―Our first goal is to 
complete the International Space Station by 2010.  We will finish what we have started, 
we will meet our obligations to our 15 international partners on this project.‖508  Without 
meeting these obligations the ISS partners would not consider cooperating in the VSE or 
future plans.509  However, to pay for the VSE, the U.S. indicated it would withdraw 
completely from the ISS by 2015.  The Obama administration, per the recommendation 
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of the Augustine Commission, has proposed staying with the ISS until at least 2020.  ―A 
decision not to extend its operation would significantly impair the U.S. ability to develop 
and lead future international spaceflight partnerships.‖510  Instead of abandoning the ISS 
for a new exploration plan, the two should be integrated.511
,512   By finding a role for the 
ISS in the exploration plans, the capabilities and intentions of the ISS will increase and 
evolve giving the program more power for bargaining then it has had previously.513 
However, cooperation is not without negative aspects and risks mainly stemming 
from delays, cost increase and technology transfers.  As Ehrenfreund and Peter state, 
―Political changes, lack of vision and investment, natural disasters, and unstable 
economic conditions in spacefaring countries are factors that can all lead to the 
cancellation or delay of space exploration activities.‖514  Other reasons for delays are due 
to ―legal issues and intellectual property rights regulations.‖515  The ISS is a prime 
example.  The delays in the initial Russian modules raised doubts of the actual feasibility 
of the ISS.  These delays also caused unexpected costs to the other partners.516  
Additionally, following the Columbia accident and delayed return of the space shuttle, 
the launch of Europe‘s contributions were delayed over three and a half years.517,518 
Delays lead to possible increases in cost.  As Rendleman and Faulconer describe, 
―There is no easy way to back out of cooperative relationships once they have been 
initiated.  The end result of this is that one may choose to endure the high price and 
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continue even failed cooperative efforts.‖519  Ehrenfreund and Peter observe that ―The 
management of international programs adds layers of complexity to their specification 
and management and introduce additional elements of dependency and risk that can 
undermine successful performance and increase total costs.‖520  Once again, the ISS is an 
example of cooperation leading to increased cost.  According to Rendleman and 
Faulconer, ―Billions of dollars have been squandered in order to construct, supply and 
operate it…The need to support the ISS has gobbled up moneys needed by other 
programs…‖521 
Lastly, there is the concern with the U.S. Congress about technology transfer.  
This is especially true in regards to China.  As Rendleman and Faulconer described the 
relationship between the U.S. and China, ―space cooperation between the two countries 
has thus far been only marginal given the strict security controls that needed to be 
imposed.‖522  The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and International Trafficking in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR) govern technology transfer.  The AECA seeks ―to slow the 
proliferation of missile and other technologies used to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction,‖523 while ITAR ―defines many commercial, dual-use space technologies as 
munitions.‖524  Johnson-Freese equated this process to be like Alice trying to talk to the 
Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland.  She writes, 
The events leading up to the convening of the Cox Committee by the US 
Congress in 1998, and those following the declassification of its report in 
1999, have had a significant worldwide impact on the US export licensing 
process. US laws that were once business-friendly have become more 
stringent to accommodate national security concerns, but with no 
differentiation between potential adversaries and allies.525 
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To address these problems, the Obama Administration has implemented an Export 
Control Reform Initiative.  As descried on the Export.gov website, ―The Administration 
is implementing the reform in three phases.  Phases I and II reconcile various definitions, 
regulations, and policies for export controls, all the while building toward Phase III, 
which will create a single control list, single licensing agency, unified information 
technology system, and enforcement coordination center.‖526  In a White House Press 
Release on March 8, 2013, ―President Obama signed an Executive Order today to update 
delegated presidential authorities over the administration of certain export and import 
controls under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and yesterday the Administration 
notified Congress of the first in a series of changes to the U.S. Munitions List.‖527 
There is still more progress to be made if international cooperation is going to be 
an essential feature on future projects, but the structure of the ISS relationship was on a 
much more even footing than before for the international partners.
528,529
  Entering into 
partnerships with other countries that have similar space objectives is the best, if not the 
only, way to achieve an ambitious future space agenda for the world.  According to the 
Augustine Commission, ―The strong and tested working relationship among international 
partners is perhaps the most important outcome of the ISS program.‖530 
As Jean-Jacques Dordain, Director General of ESA, stated ―We know now that it 
is always easier not to cooperate, but that it is always more difficult to succeed alone.‖531  
Therefore, five countries, or a group of countries in Europe‘s case, were researched to see 
if a working relationship for human spaceflight would be advantageous.  The countries 
included Russia, China, Europe, Japan and India.  Along with the U.S., Russia and China 
have both obtained the capability to launch humans safely into space.  Europe and Japan 
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have extensive human spaceflight experience, but that comes from hitching a ride from 
the U.S. and Russia.  India has launch capability, but thus far only has plans for a human 
space capability.  The Augustine Commission summarized the capabilities of these 
countries: 
Russia has a complete suite of space capabilities, from a robust launch 
vehicle stable to a broad spectrum of spacecraft design, production and 
operation capabilities…The highly evolved Soyuz spacecraft is currently 
programmed to become the linchpin of the ISS in the immediate future. 
Russia has also demonstrated capabilities in: large space structures; 
pressurized modules; life support; power generation and storage; 
communications; thermal control; propulsion and attitude control; 
guidance and navigation; remote sensing; computation equipment; 
subsystems; and operations techniques… 
The PRC [People‘s Republic of China] has demonstrated capabilities in 
life support, power generation and storage, pressurized module 
construction, in-space propulsion and attitude control, guidance and 
navigation, communications and computation… 
ESA is a partner in human spaceflight for the ISS and has demonstrated 
large pressurized habitable modules for use as part of the ISS, as well as 
launch, rendezvous, and other critical capabilities.  Through Arianespace 
(a French company owned by the French government), the Europeans 
possess the most active commercial space launch program in the 
world…The Automated Transfer Vehicle has provided significant 
logistics support to the ISS and has the potential to be upgraded to a cargo 
return vehicle, and eventually a human-carrying spacecraft… 
JAXA…is a partner in the ISS.  Its workhorse launch vehicle, the H-II, has 
been upgraded to the H-II Transfer Vehicle for use as a logistics carrier to 
the ISS...it has extensive capabilities…which includes teleoperated 
robotics. Japan has extensive experience in Earth- and space-science 
missions and telecommunications satellites, as well as in-ground-based 
facilities for astronaut training, mission operations, communications and 
tracking… 
ISRO possesses two very capable launch vehicles…To date, the Indian 
space program has concentrated on telecommunications, Earth 
observation, and other low-Earth orbit satellite programs.532 
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These countries‘ attention seems to be toward the moon, in part due to the VSE.  China, 
ESA, Japan and India have recently sent independent unmanned spacecraft to the lunar 
surface.533 
1. Competition or Cooperation? 
Why should the United States send people into space now and how should the 
U.S. go about proceeding in the future?  The first step should be to have a specific goal 
that the U.S. human spaceflight program will accomplish.  As the Augustine Commission 
discovered, ―Too often in the past, planning the human spaceflight program has begun 
with the ‗where‘ rather than ‗why.‘‖534  Unfortunately, while this may be the best 
technical means to proceed, it is not always the best political strategy.  Szajnfarber, 
Coles, Sondecker, Wicht, and Weigel argue, ―…for a clear destination, not because this is 
the most sustainable technical approach, but because it may be the only politically 
feasible approach for accomplishing a large-scale exploration endeavor that requires 
international cooperation for success.‖535  This forces the question to become not just 
how the U.S. should proceed, but where. 
The answer is that cooperation should be the way forward in human spaceflight 
exploration and the moon should be the next destination.  As noted above from McHugh 
during the competition of the 1960s space race and now with the ISS, international 
cooperation is the best way to proceed.  As identified by the ISECG, ―Sustainable space 
exploration is a challenge that no one nation can undertake on its own.‖536  The initial 
steps for forging a cooperative program can be found in the ISS program, having ―forged 
strong ties, including cultural and political understanding.‖537  As Handberg and Li 
stated, ―space activities became in practice yet another device by which to politically bind 
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their allies more closely in this important field.‖538  The major benefits of cooperation are 
summarized below by Ehrenfreund, Peter, Schrogl, and Logsdon: 
The benefits of international cooperation are numerous and well 
documented. Among others, they include improving capability, sharing 
costs, building common interests and increasing the total level of available 
resources, eliminating the duplication of efforts, and improving 
international relationships. Cooperation potentially makes the 
implementation of a space project more affordable to each individual 
partner involved, while enriching the pool of scientific and technological 
expertise. In addition, international cooperation offers robustness and 
redundancy through added mission options and access to alternative 
transportation systems. It also enhances domestic legitimacy of space 
projects and gives them international credibility and consequently makes 
them less vulnerable to cancellation due to domestic political or financial 
problems.539 
The benefits for cooperation are politically, economically and technologically based.  As 
the ISECG states, ―Nations have varying scientific, technological and societal objectives 
for their space activities, and—inevitably—some can afford to do more than others.‖540  
However, together nations can afford to do even more then individually. 
How nations should cooperate is seen in Ryan Zelnio‘s four types of cooperation: 
coordination, augmentation, interdependence, and integration.  Coordination is defined as 
―Each country operates a separate program independent of others but coordinates on 
technical and scientific matters.‖541  This appears to be the easiest of the four for 
countries to agree too.  The ISECG has started along this path.  The ISECG set-up a 
―Global Exploration Strategy (GES): The Framework for Coordination.‖  As a part of this 
framework, 14 space agencies set out to produce ―a common set of space exploration 
themes.‖542  The GES ―makes the case for a voluntary, non-binding forum (the 
Coordination Mechanism) where nations can share plans for space exploration and 
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collaborate to strengthen both individual projects and the collective effort.‖543  As stated 
in the GES, ―The historic decision to start the human journey to Mars is still several years 
away. However, two important first steps are being taken: first, the engagement of more 
nations in space exploration; and second, the start of global coordination, as foreseen in 
this Framework document.‖544  While this is an important starting point and an 
immediate way forward for cooperation, it lends itself to duplication of effort as already 
demonstrated on the multiple countries‘ missions to the moon.545 
Zelnio‘s second type of cooperation is through augmentation.  He defines 
augmentation as ―other countries provide for and enhance the project of the prime 
country but are not on the critical path.‖546  While in the past, this has been the preferred 
method for the U.S., potential partners such as ESA are no longer willing to jump on 
board and accept a back seat to the plans of the U.S.  Scott Pace writes ―human space 
exploration beyond Earth orbit will not be done by individual nations…so it makes sense 
to ask potential international partners what they are capable of and interested in doing… 
[The U.S.] can and should avoid unrealistic and dangerous hopes that other nations will 
naturally align their interests with ours in space.‖547  In Audrey Schaffer‘s analysis of 
what other nations want from space collaboration, from the perspective of 10 of the 14 
GES nations, ―The mechanism must allow all space agencies to make a visible 
contribution to exploration…[the mechanism] cannot be synonymous with a single US-
centric project for which other space agencies provide only augmented capabilities.‖548 
Interdependence, the third type of cooperation, is defined as ―cooperation on the 
critical path of the project as well as on functional systems with each participant still 
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controlling their part of the project.‖549  To make this type of international cooperation 
work, Launius offers some guidelines to follow: 
 Cooperation is undertaken on a project-by-project basis, not on an on-
going basis for a specific discipline, general effort, etc. 
 Each cooperative project must be both mutually beneficial and 
scientifically valid. 
 Scientific and technical agreement must precede any political 
commitment. 
 Funds transfers will not take place between partners, but each will be 
responsible for its own contribution to the project. 
 All partners will carry out their part of the project without technical or 
managerial expertise provided by the other. 
 Scientific data will be made available to researchers of all nations 
involved in the project for early analysis.
550
 
As he summarizes, ―it is imperative that a coordinated approach to project definition, 
planning, funding, and conduct of future missions be undertaken.‖551  This is the model 
that the ISS is based on.  As Correll and Peter write, it is based on ―pooling resources and 
maintaining clean divisions in systems, tasks and responsibilities…‖552  Currently, this is 
the most logical way forward with countries such as Russia, China and India to overcome 
the technical transfer issue. 
The fourth type of cooperation is integration.  Integration is ―full cooperation with 
shared and joint research and development with a pooling of resources.  This framework 
spreads out the financial costs, and utilizes the industries of multiple nations while still 
maintaining a single entity that controls the critical path.‖553  This is the model that ESA 
uses.  While this is the ultimate goal for cooperation, it is not likely in the near future.  
This is due in part to the high levels of technology transfer554 and the U.S. desire to 
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maintain program and budget decisions independently.555  As a truly cooperative method, 
integration is the ultimate goal and may someday be achievable, for the near future it is 
not viable.  Therefore, the future and next steps for human spaceflight with international 
partners will need to begin as a coordinated and interdependent effort at the onset, similar 
to the ISS. 
Although there should be flexibility in what projects a country can be a part of, 
the projects themselves need to be more rigid.  A main disadvantage to cooperation is the 
perception of many international partners that the U.S. has a tendency to change plans 
with each new administration.556  A solution was provided by the Augustine 
Commission: 
Programs need to be planned, budgeted and executed so that development 
and operations can proceed in a phased, somewhat overlapping 
manner...Changes to ongoing programs should be made only for 
compelling reasons… human spaceflight program are in need of stability, 
having been redirected several times in the last decade.557 
Although disruptive to the original program agreed upon by the U.S., Europe, Canada, 
and Japan, the inclusion of Russia in what became the ISS, saved the space station.  This 
was a change for a compelling reason. 
A planned and budgeted program takes into account the political and economic 
aspect of international cooperation.  As Joan Johnson-Freese writes, ―Americans are not 
known for patience.  The real danger for the United States is in ceding space exploration 
and leadership to China because it lacks the political will to proceed at a steady, 
supportable pace.‖558  But a steady pace, is often perceived as a slow pace.  Therefore, in 
order to have political backing, the public needs to be involved worldwide.559  Currently, 
the world appears to be looking toward the moon as the next destination.  Below is a table 
comparing the potential lunar capabilities of NASA, ESA and JAXA. 
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Figure 3.  Potential lunar capabilities560 
―C‖ indicates the agency is capable. ―D‖ denotes it is in development.  ―N‖ means 
the agency is not capable and has not indicated plans to pursue the element.  ―F‖ signifies 
a capability the country has identified as being involved with in the future.  The asterisk 
means that only a part of the element was considered.561  Russia, China, and India were 
not included in the chart mainly due to the limits of information surrounding their 
programs.  Russia and China have proven their capabilities in robotic precursor missions 
to the moon, a crew capsule, crew launch vehicle, and pressurized modules.  While India 
has completed robotic missions and a launch vehicle, they are further behind the other 
countries‘ technology for lunar exploration.  Working together in a coordinated, 
integrated cooperation all of these spacefaring countries will one day be able to have 
habitats on the moon. 
B. AREAS TO CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis concentrated on human spaceflight and national programs.  Therefore, 
an area for further research includes other aspects of a countries‘ space program, such as 
robotics.  While the Augustine Commission also concentrated on human spaceflight, they 
suggested that 
both the human spaceflight program and the science program are key parts 
of a great nation‘s space portfolio… It is in the interest of both science and 
human spaceflight that a credible and well rationalized strategy of 
coordination between the two types of pursuit be developed—without 
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forcing unwarranted intermingling in areas where each would better 
proceed on its own.562 
Since this thesis concentrated on national programs, commercial options were not 
investigated.  However, research in this area is warranted as commercial companies are 
supplying the ISS and making plans for developing human rated launch vehicles.  This 
seems to be an up-and-coming option to pay attention to.  U.S. companies such as Space 
Exploration Technologies Corporation, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Boeing, and Sierra 
Nevada Corporation have already received money from NASA under the Commercial 
Orbital Transportation System effort and two rounds of Commercial Crew Development 
to support research for future human spaceflight.563 
Lastly, while this thesis concentrated on politics, economics, and technology, it 
did not take into consideration cultural differences.  As Ehrenfreund, Peter, Schrogl, and 
Logsdon state, 
International cooperation adds layers of complexity to the specification 
and management of the programs and introduces additional elements of 
dependence and risk that can undermine successful performance within 
budget and the planned schedule. One of those layers of complexity is the 
issue of cross-cultural management. 
A cooperative framework has therefore not only to take into account the 
differences in political systems, budgets, and goals but also the cultural 
values of the involved actors. The increased participation of new actors 
and stakeholders in space exploration activities requires a multi-
dimensional understanding of culture and business practices. The new era 
of space exploration will be international, human centric, trans-
disciplinary and participatory. An effective integration of the stakeholders 
requires bridging the cultural differences in market and financial aspects, 
technology, regulations and outreach to provide common strategies.‖564 
More detail in these areas will need to be researched to make a more complete, informed 
decision in the future of human space exploration. 
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